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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine how religious commitment impacts the neural 
processing of morally laden information. Event-related potentials were recorded while 35 
participants, scoring either high or low on the Religious Commitment Inventory-10, read 
scenarios describing a social interaction with one of three endings: moral violations, 
conventional violations, or neutral acts. Participants judged all scenarios as either “OK” 
or “Not OK.” Right brain hemisphere amplitudes were significantly larger than the left 
hemisphere for participants with high religious commitment. This finding suggests those 
with high religious commitment may process morally laden stimuli less abstractly and 
more veridically than those with low religious commitment.  
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An Event-Related Potential Examination of Neural Processing of Moral Judgments 
Our senses of right and wrong pervade our existence (Kohlberg 1981), are shaped 
by our culture (e.g., religious commitment; Worthington et al., 2003) throughout 
development (Moll et al., 2005), and can serve both devastating and salutary roles in 
overcoming psychological trauma (Litz et al., 2009). However, little is written, as yet, to 
explain how neural functioning during the generative processes of moral reasoning may 
lead to greater understanding of how culture helps to form judgments and overall senses 
of right and wrong. This study is a necessary first step in elucidating the relationship 
between a specific aspect of culture and moral reasoning at the neural level.   
As counseling psychologists, understanding how our clients think and reason is 
tantamount to understanding our clients as meaning makers. Kohlberg (1969) stated the 
cognitive processes involved in thinking and reasoning are in essence, a relating of events 
where knowledge and information from the world are integrated. Importantly, this 
reasoning encompasses the complete range of situations requiring thinking, judgment, 
and reasoning, from mundane decisions to complex dilemmas that may result in 
inevitable harm to oneself or to another. Kegen (1982) elaborated this point, stating that 
in order to understand our clients, reasoning must be viewed as an active relating and 
experiencing of the world rather than merely what the client knows.  He stated: “to 
understand a client is to enter into that region between an event and a reaction to it—the 
place where it actually becomes an event for that person” (Kegen, p. 2). Hayes (1994) 
augmented this point, stating that when reasoning occurs, it is in fact our clients 
experiencing, understanding, and making meaning of the world.  Hayes stated, “it is in 
this zone of mediation that counselors help clients to make better meaning of their 
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experience” (p. 262). Indeed, clients will face countless judgments in their everyday 
experience (Moll et al., 2005), including salient reasoning and judgment situations in the 
counseling room, such as examining personal motives, deciding what one should or 
would do, and contemplating hypothesized outcomes of acts that may affect others 
(Hayes, 1994).  
However, reasoning and judgment are multifaceted enterprises that are not 
constrained to one domain (Turiel, 1983). They possess a relationship with contextual 
factors (e.g., religious commitment) that, as yet, is not understood comprehensively 
(Baumsteiger, Chenneville, & McGuire, 2014) and involve distinct brain areas and 
systems (Moll et al., 2005). These brain areas and systems operate largely outside of our 
conscious awareness (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2005), and, consequently, our 
understanding of them may be limited using traditional research techniques and 
paradigms. For instance, Decety and Cacioppo (2012) found that many of the neural 
systems involved in processing morally laden information were activated prior to the 
activation of areas associated with conscious awareness. Survey research and self-report 
measures are most commonly used in the body of judgment and moral reasoning 
research, but these explicit techniques are susceptible to a number of validity threats 
including demand characteristics and social desirability bias  (Heppner, Wampold, & 
Kivlighan, 2008). Moreover, attitudes that may influence judgments and reasoning, such 
as discrimination or bias, often lie outside of respondents’ awareness and may remain 
undetected using only explicit measures (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
The direct study of the brain could provide a solution to these methodological 
concerns.  Integration of neuroscience into these paradigms may prove indispensible in 
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deepening our understanding of the mechanisms and contextual influences underlying 
reasoning that occur both within and beyond conscious awareness. As noted by 
Goncalves and Perrone-McGovern (2014), our understanding of the neurobiological basis 
of behavior, cognition, and psychological processes has undergone a radical 
transformation in recent years with advances in the field of neuroscience (e.g., 
methodological advances in neuroimaging, neurophysiological methods, and 
neuromodulation techniques).  Goncalves and Perrone-McGovern delineated the benefits 
of integrating neuroscience into traditional counseling psychology research paradigms, 
and proposed a developmental conceptual model for understanding the effects of 
environmental factors on neural processes. They proposed that brain networks are 
influenced by psychological factors such as social cognition, that are in turn influenced 
by interpersonal and environmental factors, which could include exposure to moral 
dilemmas and participation in or commitment to an organized religion.  
Morality and Moral Reasoning 
The attempt to define what constitutes moral behavior is a perennial philosophical 
issue concerning the very nature of what is good. As humans, we have historically 
glorified our ability to reason, holding virtuous our ability to conquer our emotions and 
passions through logic and mental discipline (Haidt, 2013). Kohlberg (1976, 1981) 
embodied this reverence for rationalism in his foundational model of moral reasoning; 
however, emerging research belies established conceptualizations of human moral 
functioning (Haidt, 2013; Moll et al., 2005). Rather than reason alone, evidence now 
exists that our moral judgments occur as an interaction of multiple influences and 
processes such as motive and emotional states (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Moll et 
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al., 2005). The moral neuroscience literature has burgeoned with the utilization of brain 
imaging and neurorecording technologies such as electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This has facilitated increased 
understanding of the neural processes involved in moral functioning. Moreover, the use 
of event related potential (ERP) methods has promoted understanding into the various 
inputs along the rapid  time course of moral functioning (Yoder & Decety, 2014). If 
counseling psychologists are to truly understand how clients experience the world 
through their thinking, judgment, and reasoning, it will require an understanding of these 
underlying brain systems as well as the dynamics between the neural systems that shape 
clients’ experience and perception of the world.  Further, it will require an understanding 
of how contextual and environmental factors (e.g., religious commitment) may affect 
these brain systems and ultimately shape our clients’ experiences.   
Historically, religion has been seen as inextricably linked to morality; however, 
recent studies have revealed a complex and often indirect relationship between morality 
and religiosity (Baumsteiger, Chennevile, & McGuire, 2014). Religious values and 
morality both tap into individuals’ most deeply held beliefs and attitudes about the world, 
guiding thought and influencing action. Within a counseling environment, both religion 
and morality are of paramount importance as they are pivotal in informing the nature of a 
disorder, the aims for therapy, and the course of treatment (Benish et al., 2011; 
Worthington, 1988). Benish and colleagues explained that beliefs about the nature of 
disorder and the course and treatment are formed through illness myths, which are 
culturally shaped experiences of distress. For example, one culture may tend to attribute 
mental illness to personal weakness, whereas another may attribute it to genetic, 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  10 
biological, social, or environmental factors. Moreover, therapist and client agreement 
regarding the nature of a disorder, its course, and treatment conduces to more positive 
treatment outcomes (Benish, Quintana, & Wampold, 2011; Worthington, 1988).  
However, little research exists examining the neural correlates of morality and religious 
commitment, specifically with ERP methods allowing for the high temporal resolution 
necessary to examine the rapid sequential activation of neural areas in the time course of 
moral processing. This would be valuable to counseling psychologists, as understanding 
the relationship between morality and religion—and their influence on the process of 
reasoning and judgment during moral functioning—could provide an objective layer of 
understanding into the mechanisms that underpin how information from the world is 
internalized and construed into meaning for clients.  
Moving from Rationalism 
With increased sophistication of neuroscience technologies over the previous two 
decades, researchers have begun to examine how the brain processes morally laden 
stimuli (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al. 2005). This novel source of information has led to 
a paradigm shift in our understanding of the processes of moral decision-making (Haidt, 
2013). The regnant model of moral decision making for much of the late previous century 
was the Kohlberg (1981) rationalist model of moral development. Kohlberg (1976) 
developed an interviewing method, which he used with both adults and children to 
examine how they resolved hypothetical moral dilemmas. Kohlberg (1981) found that 
individuals’ development of moral reasoning occurs in increasing rational sophistication 
over six total stages, with the progression through these stages predicated on how an 
individual reasons about the nature of justice and fairness.  
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Kohlberg’s model was not without criticism. For example, Turiel (1983) 
expounded on differences between social conventions (i.e., rules that are culturally 
dependent, change across social groups, and serve to facilitate social coordination) and 
morals (i.e., universally held rules that transcend social and political authorities). Further, 
Turiel demonstrated that children were capable of distinguishing the difference between 
violations of morality and violations of social conventions as early as preschool, much 
earlier than Kohlberg (1981) postulated. Moreover, Smetana (2006) demonstrated this 
capability emerges in individuals as early as 39 months old.  
Other competing theoretical models were proposed in the latter part of the last 
century, which began subtly parsing the human moral experience into dissociable 
components. For example, Rest (1986) dissected moral reasoning into four components: 
(1) moral awareness, which centers on a sensitivity to moral information; (2) moral 
judgment, which is the act of assessing rightness or wrongness of an action; (3) moral 
motivation, which centers on the degree of likelihood for acting on a moral judgment, and 
(4) moral character, which is the ability to commit to and carry out a line of action despite 
pressures or adversity. Jones (1991) elaborated on the Rest model, adding the component 
of moral intensity, which accounts for how a morally laden situation or dilemma itself 
may have varying degrees of impact on an individual’s moral reasoning. 
 While these models offered an expanded view of moral functioning, they were 
consistent with Kohlberg (1981), in postulating moral judgment occurs only within the 
cognitive domain. In fact, Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983) contended that no single 
behavior has any particular moral standing unless it is driven by an explicit and deliberate 
moral judgment. This emphasis on cognitive processes during moral judgment drew 
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criticism (Haidt, 2013; Wilson, 1993), as Kohlberg’s model was thought to myopically 
constrain moral functioning to reason alone. As will be explained in ensuing sections, a 
paradigm shift occurred in the literature, as other influences and processes (e.g., 
emotional processes, evolutionarily adapted sensitivities) were found to be involved in 
human moral functioning (Moll et al., 2005). As the body of research on human moral 
reasoning grew, several other empirically grounded theories of moral function arose 
(Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Moll et al., 2005; Waldmann & 
Dietrich, 2007), each espousing the notion that moral judgment occurs when a 
transgression or moral violation triggers a specific moral computation. For example, 
Greene et al. (2001) discovered brain areas associated with emotional processing are 
activated during moral reasoning tasks and are likely included in the moral reasoning 
calculus. He described a dual process model in which moral violations activate automatic 
emotional processes that influence or even compete with controlled cognitive processes 
in arriving at a moral judgment. Haidt (2001) invoked social influence as well as 
affective processes with his social intuitionist model. Similar to the dual process model, 
Haidt’s model stated that moral violations trigger an automatic, pre-cognitive intuition, 
which is followed by ex post facto reasoning. Haidt stated these intuitions occur rapidly 
and without conscious deliberation, even possessing an affective valence about the 
situation.  Moreover, he stated reasoning only occurs in the face of social pressures 
calling for one to explain the intuition. In other words, a judgment arises automatically 
and rapidly, and reasoning occurs more slowly and only when faced with social pressures 
calling for justification. Put simply, evidence has been emerging that there is more to 
moral judgment than conscious cognitive reasoning alone.  
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Toward a Neural Model of Human Morality 
Moll et al. (2005) tied the Green et al. (2001) model with the extant brain lesion, 
cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology literature to construct a model of human 
moral cognition. This model incorporated all brain areas implicated across this literature 
and circumvented their individual deficits in explaining moral behavioral phenomenon. 
The Moll et al. model is comprised of three main components that are thought to interact 
and bind moral coloring to our conscious experience:  
1. Structured event complexes which are context-dependent representations of 
events and event sequences in the prefrontal cortex (PFC);  
2. Social and functional features which is context-independent knowledge (i.e., 
semantic and featural knowledge) implicating the anterior and posterior 
temporal cortex; and  
3. Central motive and emotional states, which entail the context independent 
activation of motivational and emotional states in limbic/paralimbic 
structures.   
According to Moll et al. (2005), structured event knowledge is stored in different 
subdivisions of the PFC depending on the type of event knowledge, with novel and more 
difficult multitasking events associated with more anterior areas of the PFC (e.g., long-
term goals and multi-stage events like making plans and thinking about the future). Social 
and emotional event knowledge are associated with ventromedial PFC areas which are 
fundamental in formation of attitudes and social stereotypes, and overlearned sequences 
(e.g., tying one’s shoes or zipping a coat) are associated with medial and posterior PFC 
areas. Social perceptual and functional feature knowledge pertains to extracting social 
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information (i.e., social perceptions, like facial expression, prosody of speech, gaze, body 
posture, and gestures) as well as functional features of the environment. These specific 
areas serve as a sort of social decoding mechanism, as navigating our everyday social 
worlds requires the processing of vast amounts of information in the form of countless 
moral appraisals. Information from the world is extracted and processed by these brain 
areas, giving rise to the moral appraisals necessary for navigating social situations, 
“social functional features code for context-independent semantic properties that are 
extracted from different social situations” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 805).  Finally, central 
motive states (e.g., aggression, guilt, shame, etc.), serve to provide emotional coloring as 
a basic mechanism for motivation. Researchers have found these motive and emotional 
states are consistently associated with limbic and paralimbic areas (e.g., Decety & 
Howard, 2013; Greene et al., 2001). The emotions elicited from these areas also serve 
important social navigational functions. For instance, guilt may arise when someone 
perceives failure to uphold a societal standard, whereas pride may be experienced when a 
societal standard is perceived to be upheld.  
It is important to note the Moll et al. (2005) model of human moral cognition 
allows for the integration of culture with moral reasoning. It follows that religion, a 
salient cultural input (Worthington, 1988), would dovetail into the model in at least two 
possible ways. First, it would inform the type of context-dependent structural event-
knowledge stored in prefrontal areas. As Moll stated, “the PFC has a central role in the 
internalization of moral values and norms through the integration of cultural and 
contextual information during development” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 804). Second, it would 
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inform the context-independent semantic knowledge housed in the pSTS during the 
extraction of social functional information in different social situations. 
Goncalves and Perrone-McGovern (2014) described a model possessing some 
functional overlap with the Moll et al. (2005) model.  For instance, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and temporal parietal junction (also reported in the literature 
as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) [Decety & Caccioppo, 2012]) are areas 
implicated as a component of the Default Mode Network.  
“the social cognition network is a Default Mode Network connecting the 
mechanisms involved in spontaneous rest activity between the temporal parietal 
junction, posterior cingulate cortex, and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, areas of 
the brain that are associated with self-representation and theory of mind 
processes.  Disruption of these networks has symptomatic expressions such as 
social inadequacy, attachment deficits, or lack of empathy” (Goncalves & 
Perrone-McGovern, 2014; p. 509).  
Though not specifically a moral reasoning model, attachment deficits and lack of 
empathy are distinguishing characteristics of deficient moral functioning (Decety & 
Howard, 2013). Moreover, this functional overlap speaks to affective and cognitive 
inputs that may be necessary to moral reasoning (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Greene et 
al., 2001). Furthering this point, Decety and Cacioppo cautioned against considering the 
function of these brain areas as unique to moral reasoning, stating, “moral reasoning 
seems to be underpinned by specific neural circuitry, but, in fact, these circuits…involve 
regions and systems underlying specific affective states and cognitive and motivational 
processes” (p. 3068).   
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The Virtue of Event-Related Potentials 
The identification of the underlying brain areas was an essential first step in 
understanding the cognitive neuroscience of human moral functioning. This first step was 
also important for counseling psychologists because it offers at the very least a 
biophysical marker for specific deficits in healthy personal and interpersonal functioning. 
Moreover, with these underlying components identified, an examination of the temporal 
dynamics (i.e., how these areas activate in sequence over time when processing morally 
laden information) became possible. Neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI were crucial 
in identifying the neural areas of human moral cognition; however, their utility is limited 
in that these techniques have very low temporal resolution and may fail to capture all of 
the activations—and sequences of activations—of neural areas and systems in the rapid 
time course of moral reasoning (Yoder & Decety, 2014). As such, it may be of limited 
utility in examining how the components of the Moll et al. (2005) model activate in 
sequence to produce moral functioning. Indeed, the prefrontal areas implicated in the 
aforementioned moral reasoning models are activated very rapidly post stimulus onset. 
During moral reasoning tasks, Decety and Cacioppo (2012) found the vmPFC was 
activated between 182-304 ms post stimulus, and Lahat, Helwig, and Zelazo (2013) 
found general activation of prefrontal areas between 200-500ms post stimulus. 
Considering this limitation, electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques, specifically those 
examining event-related potentials (ERPs) may be uniquely suited to examine moral 
reasoning’s rapid time course, as the temporal resolution of these techniques can be at the 
1 ms level (Yoder, & Decety, 2014).  
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What is ERP? Having made the case for ERP’s utility in investigating the time 
course of human moral functioning, a discussion about the nature of ERP is warranted. 
Brain ERPs are a detection of the electric field generated on the scalp by the movement 
of ions within neural mass in fixed temporal relation to the arrival of information or 
movement (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). ERPs must be distinguished from evoked 
potentials, which reflect sensory processing; ERPs evaluate neural activity in response to 
a certain event (Hruby & Marsalek, 2003). Further, ERP research is predicated on the 
premise that psychological processes leading to the completion of a certain task require 
changes in content of thought and attention, and these are evident in changes of electrical 
activity that neural systems generate (Hruby & Marsalek, 2003). 
ERPs are measured with the use of electroencephalography (EEG), which entails 
placing a number of electrodes in specific places about the scalp using a conductive gel 
(Landa et al., 2014). The EEG data is examined before, during, or after stimulus onset, 
and potential differences between pairs of electrodes (with one electrode recording) are 
sampled several hundred times per second (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). Electric scalp 
fields vary over time in both strength and location, providing a topography of electrical 
activity, and offering spatial and temporal information about processing in relation to 
time-locked stimuli (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). Time-locked stimuli are important to 
ERP research because ERPs are reported as an average of multiple EEG readings from 
repeated exposures to the same stimulus (Landa et al., 2014).  
The N2 component. Time windows of ERPs are subdivided into components. 
Peaks and troughs of the waveforms are traditionally thought of as components that 
reflect maximal activation of brain processes in response to the stimulus (Brandeis & 
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Lehmann, 1986). Past researchers have established that the N2 component is a negative-
going wave that peaks between 200 and 350 ms post stimulus onset and is an index of 
cognitive conflict detection (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). Cognitive conflict occurs 
when multiple competing actions are contemplated with only one of these actions being 
the appropriate course of action that is selected (Cohen, 2014). The N2 is usually 
generated at medial-frontal sites and is larger when conflict is high (Azizian, Freitas, 
Parvaz, & Squires, 2006; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive 
conflict, as detected by N2 activation, has been commonly studied with the use of go/no-
go tasks that entail a tendency to make prepotent but incorrect responses (Donkers & van 
Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). However, the N2 is not elicited specifically to 
go/no-go tasks. Botvinick et al. reviewed the literature on N2 as an index of cognitive 
conflict monitoring with studies using response competition, adjustments in perceptual 
selection, and maintenance of contextual information. Lahat, Zelwig, and Zelazo (2013) 
also observed N2 activation in both children and young adults during tasks that involved 
judging morally laden scenarios. Source localization analyses have implicated ventral 
PFC areas (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex) and dorsomedial PFC areas (e.g., dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex [ACC]) during N2 activation (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003).  
It should be expected, then, that N2 components would be observed over frontal 
brain areas during moral reasoning tasks, as these tasks likely require participants to 
weigh potentially competing information. That is, moral reasoning tasks may require the 
consideration of social contexts as well as the interests of more than one party that are 
potentially conflicting. Moreover, it should be expected that with higher cognitive 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  19 
conflict (e.g., the greater the number and profundity of considerations), higher N2 
amplitudes would be observed.   
Brain hemisphere asymmetries. An important aspect in examining how the 
brain processes information involves an understanding of the different ways each 
hemisphere processes stimuli. Accordingly, ERP research commonly entails lateralization 
analysis, comparing waveforms across hemispheres (Luck, 2005). Previous studies 
suggested factors such as emotion and valence (Heller, 1993; Zhang, Zhou, & Oei, 2011), 
or specific characteristics about presented stimuli (Evans & Federmeier, 2007) were 
associated with differential processing across brain hemispheres. Evidence of brain 
processing asymmetries for specific tasks arose as early as the mid 1800s with Broca’s 
groundbreaking work on the localization of language production (Joynt, 1966). Broca 
identified a specific area of the brain (i.e., Broca’s Area) after examining two patients 
who had both lost their ability to speak. Both patients had suffered insult to the same 
neural area in the left hemisphere. Neural processing asymmetries are common in the 
literature (Hellige, 1993), and among the most germane to the current study are those 
produced during visual perception and language neurocognitive tasks. 
Neuroscience research on visual perception asymmetries first emerged over 50 
years ago, as Kimura (1966) discovered the left and right hemispheres produce 
differential processing of visual information. Kimura presented participants with random 
successions of letters or non-alphabetical stimuli to either the right or left visual fields. 
Kimura found that participants were able to more accurately identify letters when 
presented in the right visual field, whereas the non-alphabetical stimuli were more 
accurately identified when presented in the participants’ left visual fields. These findings 
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suggested the left hemisphere functioned to identify verbal-conceptual forms while the 
right hemisphere served to register nonverbal stimuli. Put simply, these findings 
suggested both hemispheres are involved in the processing and remembering of visually 
presented stimuli, but that the hemispheres cull different kinds of information from the 
same stimuli.  
More recently, Evans and Federmeier (2007) utilized ERP methodology to 
examine the  time course of hemispheric asymmetries during a verbal memory task. In 
their task, Evans and Federmeier presented participants with 567 nouns, each with a 
length of 4-6 letters that were selected for their frequency of use in the English language. 
These words were randomly presented in a serial fashion on either the right or left side of 
a computer screen, and a random selection of these words were repeated at random 
intervals during the task. The participants were asked to (a) fix their gaze on a cross in the 
center of the screen while the words were presented, then (b) respond “yes” if the word 
being presented had been displayed previously or “no” if it was the first presentation of 
the word. Evans and Federmeier found that stimuli processed in the right hemisphere 
(i.e., presented in the left visual field) were more accurately identified during the task 
overall, but that P2 component potentials (an index of implicit memory processing) were 
greater in left hemisphere. This suggested the left hemisphere processed visually 
presented verbal stimuli with more abstract processes while the right hemisphere was 
involved in more veridical processing.  
Religion and Differential Neural Processing 
Considering the potential influence of social contexts on moral reasoning, a 
discussion of how specific cultural inputs may affect neural processing is warranted. Moll 
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et al. (2005) called for an examination of how culturally shaped values and preferences 
may influence social interactions. Religion is one such cultural input (Baumsteiger, 
Chenneville, & McGuire, 2014). Moreover, religion has been associated with differential 
neural processing (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh & Nash, 2009). Inzlicht and colleagues 
found evidence suggesting religion may produce an emotionally palliative effect. These 
authors utilized EEG and compared ERP data of participants with varying levels of 
religious zeal as they completed the Stroop color-naming task (MacLeod, 1991), a task 
designed to be mentally difficult. It was found that higher levels of religious zeal were 
related to lower error-related neural responses. Further, source localization of this ERP 
data coincided with the N2 cognitive conflict detection literature, as these findings were a 
product of differential activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).   
Having established religion’s association with differential neural processing, a 
basis is provided to search for other possible ways that religion may affect neural 
processing. Given the inconsistent findings in the literature relating morality to religion 
(Baumsteiger, Chenneville, & McGuire, 2014), neuroscience techniques, specifically 
ERP, may be well-suited to provide another layer of insight, as it provides objective, 
high-temporal-resolution accounts of neural processing.  
Purpose and Importance of the Study 
 In the present study, I examined how the brain processes morally laden stimuli 
and the role of religion in influencing neural response.  Specifically, I examined the effect 
of religious commitment and the type of dilemma (conventional or moral) on the amount 
of neural resources needed to make a judgment about the dilemma. By examining the role 
of religious commitment and type of dilemma presented to participants, I hoped to 
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answer the call to action put forth by Gonçalves and Perrone-Mcgovern (2014) and to 
provide a foundational understating of the neural mechanisms underlying reasoning. 
Understanding this relationship is a crucial initial step toward understanding the 
processes involved in the zone of mediation where we—and our clients—make meaning 
of our experience. 
Hypotheses 
H1: It was hypothesized that differences would be found in N2 amplitude as 
measured by ERP based on religious commitment and type of dilemma, such 
that participants in the religiously committed group would have lower N2 
mean amplitudes for dilemmas depicting social conventional violations than 
participants in the non-religiously committed group, and no group differences 
based on religious commitment were predicted in mean N2 amplitude for 
dilemmas describing moral violations.       
Rationale: Based on Turiel’s (1983) theory, I expected N2 amplitudes would be 
lower for religiously committed individuals than for non religiously 
committed individuals for social conventional dilemmas and I did not expect 
group differences based on religious commitment for moral dilemmas. Turiel 
(1983) described social conventions as being bound by specific cultures, but 
argued that moral considerations are universal and independent of culture, 
centering on fairness and prevention of harm. Thus, I expected to see 
differential processing during judgments of scenarios describing social 
conventional but not moral violations.  Combining Turiel’s theory with the  
Moll et al. 2005 theory, which states that values and norms are internalized 
by integrating cultural information into the prefrontal cortex, differential 
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processing was expected between participants who are religiously committed 
and those who are not for social conventional dilemmas.  Differences based 
on religious commitment for social dilemmas were expected because 
religiously committed individuals tend to have a readily available schema for 
judging events as good or bad (Worthington et al., 2003). Conversely, those 
who are not religiously committed may lack a readily available schema and 
draw from a wider range of contextual information in considering the 
circumstance of the scenario. Thus, more attentional and neurocognitive 
resources would be required, resulting in higher mean N2 amplitudes.  
H2: It was hypothesized that differences would be found in N2 amplitude as 
measured by ERP based on the type of dilemma presented to participants 
(moral or conventional), such that when presented with a moral dilemma, 
participants would have lower N2 mean amplitude than when presented with 
a conventional dilemma.     
Rationale: Based on Turiel’s (1983; 2008) theory, moral violations are unalterable 
and consistently judged as bad across cultures and contexts. Conversely, 
social conventional violations can be changed based on social consensus or 
by authority. Taken together, I expected social conventional violations to 
require greater neurocognitive resources and consequently produce higher N2 
amplitudes compared to moral violations, as providing judgments about them 
would require drawing from a wider range of contextual information.  
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Methods 
Participants 
There were 47 students who completed the study.  However, 12 participants were 
removed from the final analysis because (a) their data were not recorded due to technical 
difficulties (n = 6) or (b) their EEG contained artifacts (e.g., muscle movement, electrical 
interference, or perspiration) that rendered the EEG unusable (n = 6).  Participants 
included in the final analysis were 35 students (27 female, 8 male) from a large 
Midwestern university who were at least 18 years of age (Mage = 21.64 years, SD = 2.047, 
range = 19-29). Participants were grouped based on their scores on a measure of religious 
commitment, with 19 scoring high in religious commitment, and 16 scoring low in 
religious commitment (see below). Participants reported their ethnicities as follows: 94% 
Caucasian, and 6% African-American. Of those participants who provided a religious 
affiliation 36% identified as Roman Catholic, 36% identified as Protestant Christian, 12% 
identified as agnostic, 12% identified as non-denominational Christian, and 4% identified 
as Other (e.g., “a blend of many to form my own and higher power mastery orientation”).     
Procedure 
Prior to data collection, approval was obtained by Ball State University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Recruitment began by first requesting permission to 
use the Counseling Psychology Department (CPSY) subject pool and a campus-wide 
email bulletin service. Following IRB approval, recruitment emails were sent to course 
instructors in the CPSY department and a recruitment bulletin was placed in the campus-
wide service. The CPSY instructors then forwarded the recruitment emails to their 
students. Additionally, approval was also granted by the IRB to recruit from a local 
Catholic church’s ministry for college students.  A recruitment email was sent to the 
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leader of the church group who then forwarded the recruitment email to the members of 
the group. All recruitment emails indicated the purpose of the study was to examine 
patterns of brain activity during reasoning tasks. Interested participants were instructed to 
contact the researcher in order to schedule a 2-hour time slot in the lab, which allowed 
sufficient time for completion of informed consent, a demographic questionnaire, a 
measure of religious commitment, and completion of a moral judgment task while having 
EEG and ERP data recorded. Participants who took part in the study through the CPSY 
pool (n=32) received two hours of research credit as partial fulfillment of course 
requirements for their courses in the CPSY Department. Participants recruited from the 
Catholic church (n=3) received a one-time stipend of $20 for taking part in the study. 
The informed consent document notified the participants of the voluntary nature 
of the study and of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants 
indicated they read and understood the information within the informed consent 
document before being allowed to participate in the study. Following the demographics 
questionnaire, participants completed a measure of religious commitment. The 
participants were then instructed to sit comfortably while the EEG cap and electrodes 
were placed in preparation for the EEG recording. After electrode placement the 
participants completed a computerized moral reasoning task (the task is described in a 
subsequent section) while EEG was recorded. After completing the task, participants 
were presented with a debriefing form, which included information about the study as 
well as contact information for the primary investigator and faculty advisor.  
Design 
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Participants were separated into groups based on their scores on a measure of 
religious commitment, the Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (RCI-10; Worthington et 
al., 2003). Worthington et al. determined the normative mean RCI-10 score for U.S. 
adults to be 26. Further, they categorized individuals with RCI-10 scores of 38 and higher 
as highly religiously committed. Consistent with these findings, participants in the 
current study were considered not religiously committed if they obtained scores between 
10 and 26 (i.e., they scored equal to or less than the mean RCI-10 score from the overall 
norming sample obtained in Worthington et al.), and highly religiously committed if they 
obtained scores of 38 and higher.  Thus, in the present study, individuals who produced 
RCI-10 scores between 27 and 37 were not included because these scores were within 
one standard deviation from the mean from overall U.S. sample obtained by Worthington 
et al. Participants’ responses to dilemmas were separated into groups based on the type of 
dilemma (i.e., moral, conventional, or neutral). These inclusion criteria were chosen 
because the mean RCI-10 scores obtained in the Worthington et al. (2003) norming 
samples from Christian churches, Christian agencies, and students at Christian private 
universities ranged from 37-39, while the overall mean from secular institutions (i.e., not 
explicitly religious) was 26.   The amplitude of brain waves measured by ERP was 
compared across low and high religious commitment groups.  
A way to operationalize morality. This study utilized a computerized moral 
reasoning task programmed by this researcher using E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, n.d.). following methodology developed by Lahat, Helwig, and Zelazo 
(2013). Participants viewed the paradigm on a computer monitor with 1920 x 180 
resolution and a 60 hertz refresh rate. Participants provided their responses using a 
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Cedrus RB-530 response pad. The task included 18 blocks of 15 trials, in which a 
scenario describing a social interaction was presented (see Appendix H). Participants read 
an introduction (or stem) to each scenario and then pressed any button on a response box 
to indicate (a) they read and understood the introduction to the scenario and (b) that they 
were ready to be presented with the ending of the scenario. After pressing this button, a 
fixation cross was displayed, on which the participant was instructed to focus their 
attention. Having the participants focus on this cross minimizes motoric potentials (e.g., 
eye movements) that could perturb or overshadow the ERP. Further, the fixation cross 
was presented with randomized variable durations  (i.e., 800, 1000, or 1200 ms) in order 
to reduce EEG effects caused by higher predictability of the target stimulus. Following 
the fixation cross, participants were shown an ending to each scenario that entailed either 
a (a) moral violation, (b) social conventional violation, or (c) neutral act. The scenario 
stems were presented in randomized order, and each type of ending was presented 
randomly, but each participant was presented the stems and endings an equal number of 
times. Participants were asked to press buttons on a response box indicating they judged 
the ending to the scenario as either “OK” or “Not OK.” Participants were instructed to 
provide their responses as quickly as possible. Following the response, participants were 
shown feedback indicating their response was recorded or that no response was recorded. 
To ensure participates had adequate time to read this feedback, the feedback remained on 
the screen until participants pressed a button on the response pad.  
 Following procedures implemented by Lahat, Helwig, and Zelazo (2013), 
participants were to be excluded from the final analysis if they provided less than 24 
normative responses in each condition (i.e., moral, conventional, and neutral) during the 
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moral reasoning task. Trial counts for nonnormative responses were less than 24 for all 
participants and, thus, no participants were excluded according to this criterion. 
Normative responses, according to Lahat and colleagues, included “Not OK” judgments 
for both moral and conventional violations and “OK” judgments for neutral scenarios.  
 Participants were familiarized with the equipment and the presentation of the 
scenarios in a series of two initial practice tasks. The first task entailed presenting the 
participant with a series of single words (e.g., friendship, murder, warmth, kill) to which 
the participant pressed a button on a response box indicating they deemed the word as 
either “OK” or “Not OK.” These words were randomly selected and their only purpose 
was to orient the participant to providing judgments of presented stimuli. The second 
practice round modeled the main study and served to orient the participant to how stimuli 
were presented in the main study. For this second practice round, participants first were 
shown a scenario introducing a social interaction followed by an ending that was to be 
judged as either “OK” or “Not OK.” The scenarios were unique to the practice section 
(i.e., not the scenarios utilized for the main study) and, to ensure understanding of the 
task, the participant was provided an opportunity to repeat the trial if the opportunity for 
input was missed.  
Data Acquisition and Processing. The ERP data was collected using an elastic 
cap and an Active Two Biosemi Electric System (Biosemi, Amsterdam, the Netherlands). 
The EEG recording was conducted with 64-recording channels using silver-chloride 
electrodes with a BioSemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com; BioSemi B.V., 
Amsterdam, Netherlands) configured to the 10-20 system. A sampling rate of 2048 hz 
was used during recording, followed by a down-sampling to 512 hz to ensure faster 
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processing.  The electro-oculogram (EOG) was monitored with two electrodes, as well as 
two additional electrodes placed near the participants’ right and left mastoid processes.   
Electrical impedances during data collection were kept below 10 kΩ and were acquired 
with an online reference unique to the Active Two system (BioSemi EEG, n.d.). 
Although reliability and validity data are not typically reported for psychophysiological 
apparati, Gaspar et al (2011) examined the test-retest reliability of single-trial ERPs to 
faces over a 5-day period.  They were able to demonstrate that ERPs are reproducible 
within participants, who then are reliably differentiable from other participants in terms 
of their electrophysiological response. 
Offline, the data underwent a bandpass filter to remove frequencies below.5 and 
above 55hz.  Aberrant perspiration and non-stereotypical motor EEG artifacts were 
removed manually, and bad channels were removed from the EEG trial-wise. The 
continuous EEG was then segmented into 800ms time-locked epochs, beginning with 200 
ms before stimulus onset and continuing until 600 ms post stimulus onset. Following 
segmentation, independent component analysis (ICA) was run using EEGLAB’s runICA 
algorithm to remove eye blink and movement artifacts. ICA is a blind source separation 
technique that separates the multivariate signal into additive subcomponents, allowing for 
components of the signal (i.e., both artifactual and actual neural activity components) to 
be isolated and subtracted from the multivariate signal, if necessary (Delorne & Makeig, 
2004). Bad channel interpolation was then conducted trial-wise, and ERPs were baseline 
corrected to 200 ms prior to stimulus onset.  
Instruments 
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 The Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (RCI-10). Religious commitment 
was assessed using the RCI-10 (Worthington et al., 2003), a ten-item measure assessing 
“the degree to which a person adheres to his or her religious values, beliefs, and practices, 
and uses them in daily living” (p. 85). The scale was developed and validated across six 
studies on three samples of college students (n = 155, 132, and 150 respectively), 240 
Christian church-attending married adults, 468 undergraduates of differing religious 
backgrounds (i.e., Buddhist = 52, Muslim = 12, Hindus = 10), and 217 clients and 52 
counselors from six different counseling agencies (both religious and secular). 
Participants are asked to report how well a statement describes them, with scores ranging 
from 1 (not at all true of me) to 5 (totally true of me). Further, the RCI-10 is a particularly 
relevant measure for this study, as the underlying assumption is that a religiously 
committed individual evaluates the world through religious schemas and integrates his or 
her religion into much of his or her life (Worthington et al., 2003). In other words, this 
assumption speaks to a possible mechanism for differential processing of information 
between those who are highly religiously committed and those who are not. 
Worthington and colleagues (2003) reported the RCI-10 demonstrates reliability, 
with (a) Cronbach’s alpha at .93, indicating adequate internal consistency; and (b) 3-week 
and 5-month test-retest reliability, with Pearson coefficients of .87 and .84 respectively. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the present study was .96, demonstrating similarly adequate internal 
consistency. Worthington et al. (2003) found evidence for construct validity for the RCI-
10 when conducting an analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which participants’ RCI-10 
scores were treated as the dependent variables, and participants’ level of religiosity (i.e., 
participants’ endorsement or denial of salvation on the Rokeach’s Value Survey; 
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Rokeach, 1967) were treated as the independent variables. It was found that RCI-10 
scores were significantly higher for those who endorsed a religious value as compared to 
those who denied a religious value. Divergent validity was demonstrated in Worthington 
et al. (2003) in two separate analyses. In the first analysis, Pearson correlation 
coefficients were used to examine the relationship between RCI-10 scores with an 
endorsement of a single-item measure of spirituality as an exemplary human 
characteristic (Koenig et al., 2001). The RCI-10 scores were not correlated with an 
endorsement of spirituality as an exemplary human characteristic, r (154) = .18. The 
second analysis examined the relationship of RCI-10 scores with scores on the Visions of 
Everyday Morality Scales (VEMS; Shelton and McAdams, 1990). No correlation was 
found between the scores on these scales, r (154) = .09, p = .26, ns. Criterion validity was 
demonstrated in Worthington et al. (2003) by examining the relationship between RCI-10 
scores and frequency of attendance of religious activities. Frequency of attendance of 
religious activities was significantly correlated with scores on the RCI-10, r (154) = .70, 
p =.0001. In the current study, the scale was used to separate participants based on level 
of religious commitment.  
Validity of the Scenarios. The scenarios that were used in this study were 
developed by Lahat, Helwig, and Zelazo (2013) to operationalize the constructs of moral 
and social conventional rule violations in a format consistent with ERP methodology.  
Lahat and colleagues utilized scenarios from previous research that was theoretically 
grounded in social domain theory (Turiel, 1983) to assess judgments regarding moral and 
social conventional violations (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981; & Turiel, 1983). These 
previous studies, however, presented the scenarios in formats that are inappropriate for 
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ERP methodology. That is, ERP requires rapid, well-controlled target stimuli (Luck, 
2005), and these previous studies presented the scenarios as either lengthy narratives or a 
series of pictures. Lahat adapted these scenarios such that (a) the target stimuli (i.e., the 
endings of the scenarios) were comprised of only one or two words and were matched 
across violation type for number of syllables, and (b) the introduction of each of the 
scenarios was constant across dilemma types.  
Within the social domain theory literature, the concept of rule contingency is 
employed to assess whether the hypothetical scenarios demonstrate construct validity 
with respect to the domains they are intended to represent (Lahat et al., 2013; Nucci, 
1981; Smetana, 1981; Turiel,1983). More specifically, rule contingency is utilized to 
provide evidence of social domain theory’s construct validity by providing evidence for 
divergent validity between the moral and social conventional domains. Rule contingency 
requires participants to judge scenarios on two separate conditions, one in which 
participants are to assume there are societal rules in place prohibiting the acts described 
in the scenarios, and one in which participants are asked to provide judgments assuming 
these societal rules are removed. This is accomplished by presenting each of the scenarios 
to the participant and then asking the participant to provide a judgment about each 
scenario without providing any explicit information to the participant about the presence 
of societal rules. Following this condition, each participant is then instructed to provide 
their judgment to each scenario, but while imagining any societal rules prohibiting the 
violations in the scenarios are absent.  As an example, a participant in the first condition 
may be asked to provide a judgment about an individual who lied to someone in order to 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  33 
avoid punishment. In the second condition, the participant would be asked to provide the 
same judgment, but while imagining that societal rules prohibiting lying are absent.  
Lahat and colleagues (2013) utilized the rule contingency framework to provide 
evidence for the validity of their scenarios. That is, each participant received both of the 
rule contingency conditions during a moral judgment task. Across both rule conditions, 
participants largely revealed that (a) moral violations were “not ok” (i.e., 98.01% when 
rule assumed, and 89.67% when rule not assumed), and (b) neutral acts (i.e., scenarios 
with no moral or social conventional violation) were “ok” (i.e., 89.5% when rule 
assumed, and 97.55% when rule not assumed). In contrast to moral violations and neutral 
acts, more variation was found in responses to conventional violations: when a rule was 
assumed 87.2% judged the action as “not ok,” and when the rule was removed only 
26.75% judged the action as “not ok” (Lahat, et al). In other words, moral violations and 
neutral acts were judged similarly regardless of whether a rule was in place, whereas 
judgments of social conventional violations depended largely on whether or not a rule 
prohibiting the act was in place.  
These findings are consistent with social domain theory (Turiel, 1983), which 
states that moral considerations are universal, immutable across cultures, and center on 
prevention of harm and maintenance of fairness, and social conventional considerations 
are rule-based, change across cultures, and can be influenced by social consensus or 
authority figures. Further, participant responses to the scenarios in the study by Lahat, et 
al (2013) were consistent with the studies from which the scenarios were adapted (Nucci, 
1981; Smetana, 1981), providing evidence of criterion validity for Lahat and colleagues’ 
scenarios.  
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Nucci (1981) studied participants between 7 and 20 years of age and found that, 
across ages, (a) moral violations were construed as wrong even in the absence of a social 
rule prohibiting the acts, and (b) the majority of participants deemed conventional acts as 
acceptable in the absence of rules prohibiting the behaviors. These findings provided 
evidence for construct validity of social domain theory, as it demonstrated judgments of 
social conventional violations are alterable, whereas judgments of moral violations are 
fixed. Further, Nucci provided evidence for construct validity, as the participants were 
asked to complete an additional sorting task. This task asked participants to sort the 
depicted moral violations, social conventional violations, and scenarios involving 
personal business (i.e., “actions outside of societal regulation and moral concern” p. 114) 
as either “wrong” or “should be a person’s business.” All participants sorted the moral 
violations as wrong even in the absence of a rule. Conversely, very few of the 
participants sorted the social conventional violations as wrong in the absence of a rule.  
Smetana (1981) found the same distinction between moral and social 
conventional violations, demonstrating additional divergent validity. Smetana presented 
44 preschool children between the ages of 3 and 5 years with descriptions of conventional 
and moral transgressions. These children were asked to rate the level of seriousness of the 
violations in both the presence and absence of a rule prohibiting the acts. They were also 
asked whether these acts were acceptable in different contexts. Smetana found that moral 
transgressions were rated as more serious than conventional, providing evidence that a 
distinction between these domains emerges at an early age. The findings from this rating 
task provide evidence of convergent validity with Lahat, et al. (2013), as both the rating 
task in Smetana and the judgment tasks in Lahat, et al. demonstrated the same distinction 
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between moral and social conventional domains. Moreover, because the same distinction 
was found for Lahat and colleagues’ adaptation of Smetana’s scenarios, this provided 
additional evidence for criterion validity of the adapted scenarios.  
Lahat et al. (2013) found evidence of discriminant validity for their adapted 
scenarios in their research using ERP methodology.  Specifically, they found that mean 
N2 amplitudes for neutral scenarios were significantly lower than mean N2 amplitudes 
for both moral and conventional scenarios. This suggests a distinction between neutral 
acts and violations within the domains of social domain theory, in that both moral and 
social conventional violations were associated with higher cognitive conflict than 
scenarios entailing no violation.  The N2 component is a negative-going wave that peaks 
between 200 and 350 ms post stimulus onset. The N2 is generated in the medial-frontal 
area and evidences greater amplitude for high compared to low cognitive conflict than for 
lower cognitive conflict (Azizian et al., 2006; Botvinick et al., 2001). More specifically, 
source localization analyses have identified ventral prefrontal cortex (PFC) areas (e.g., 
orbitofrontal cortex) and dorsomedial PFC areas (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
[ACC]) during N2 activation (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2003). Further, these areas of the brain are associated with cognitive conflict 
detection (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008).  
Cognitive conflict occurs when multiple competing actions are activated, with 
only one of these actions being the appropriate course of action (Cohen, 2014).  As such, 
cognitive conflict would be appropriate in examining moral-conventional distinctions, as 
judging moral and conventional dilemmas entails the consideration of social contexts as 
well as the interests of more than one party that are potentially conflicting (Davidson, 
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Turiel, & Black 1983; Greene et al., 2001; Turiel, 1983). More specifically, cognitive 
conflict, as detected by N2 activation, has been commonly studied with the use of go/no-
go tasks that entail a tendency to make prepotent but incorrect responses (Donkers & van 
Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). However, the N2 is not elicited specifically to 
go/no-go tasks. Botvinick et al. reviewed the literature on N2 as an index of cognitive 
conflict monitoring and described studies using response competition, adjustments in 
perceptual selection, and maintenance of contextual information. Thus, evidence exists 
supporting the use of the N2 as a measure of conflict detection.   
The research findings described above support theoretical assertions of Moll et al. 
(2005), who utilized extant brain lesion, cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology 
literature to construct a model of human moral cognition. In the above paragraphs, 
evidence was provided for examining specific neural areas (i.e., PFC areas) when 
examining N2 as an index of cognitive conflict detection.  These same areas coincide 
with the Moll et al. model, strengthening the case for observing N2 ERPs in these areas to 
investigate moral-conventional distinctions. The Moll et al. model is comprised of three 
components: Structured event complexes (context-dependent representations event 
sequences in the prefrontal cortex [PFC]); social and functional features which are 
context-independent (i.e., semantic and featural knowledge) implicating the anterior and 
posterior temporal cortex; and central motive and emotional states (context independent 
activation of motivational and emotional states in limbic/paralimbic structures). Thus, the 
same PFC areas are implicated between the Moll et al. model and the cognitive conflict 
detection literature. This convergence of evidence buttresses the use of N2 amplitude in 
examining moral-conventional distinctions during judgment tasks.  
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Data Analysis 
A 2x3 mixed methods ANOVA was conducted to examine the between-subjects 
effects of religious commitment (non religiously committed vs. religiously committed) 
and within-subjects effects of type of dilemma (moral, conventional, or neutral) on the 
amplitude of brain waves as measured by ERP at N2, with level of religious commitment 
and dilemma type serving as independent variables and mean N2 amplitude serving as 
the dependent variable.  ANOVA is considered the dominant statistical technique in ERP 
research, as the great majority of cognitive ERP research involves investigating main 
effects and interactions in fully cross-factorial designs (Luck, 2005). However, because 
each participant’s mean N2 amplitude was measured for both moral and social 
conventional conditions (i.e., a within subjects factor), and each participant was only 
assigned one religious commitment condition based on their RCI-10 score (i.e., a 
between subjects factor) a mixed design ANOVA was appropriate. The 2x3 ANOVA was 
conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; Version 24).  
I hypothesized first that differences would be found in N2 amplitude as measured 
by ERP based on religious commitment and type of dilemma, such that participants in the 
religiously committed group would have lower N2 mean amplitudes for dilemmas 
depicting social conventional violations than participants in the non-religiously 
committed group, and such that no group differences based on religious commitment 
were predicted in mean N2 amplitude for dilemmas describing moral violations. This 
hypothesis was tested using a 2x3 mixed methods ANOVA in order to examine the 
interaction (if any) between the type of dilemma and whether or not a participant is 
religiously committed. A significant interaction from this omnibus test would indicate the 
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effect of dilemma type on mean N2 amplitudes is different between those who are 
religiously committed and those who are not.  
The second hypothesis stated that differences would be found in N2 amplitude as 
measured by ERP based on the type of dilemma presented to participants (moral or 
conventional), such that when presented with a moral dilemma, participants would have 
lower N2 mean amplitude than when presented with a conventional dilemma. 
From the same ANOVA conducted for the first hypothesis, a main effect for dilemma 
type on N2 amplitude would be determined by examining the F test for within-subjects 
effects. A significant omnibus within-subjects F test would indicate a difference in the 
effect of moral dilemma type on N2 amplitude, and estimated marginal means were to be 
examined to determine which dilemma type is associated with higher or lower N2 
amplitudes. Finally, because of the lack of independence inherent to within-subjects 
comparisons, covariances between groups may be a value different from zero, requiring 
the covariances to be assumed equal (i.e., the assumption of sphericity is met; Howell, 
2013).  
Results 
ERP Data 
 Examination of scalp topographical plots of the grand-averaged data for all 
participants revealed arguable central N2 component at frontocentral electrode sites for 
both moral scenarios and well-formed N2 components for conventional scenarios, all 
between 250 ms and 350 ms post stimulus onset. Per Luck (2005), ERP data was 
averaged across a cluster of electrodes (C1, Cz, C2, CPz, FC1, FCz, FC2; See Figures 1 
and 2 for analysis). Frontocentral electrodes were chosen as these electrodes overlie areas 
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implicated in moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2005) as well as cognitive conflict detection 
(Cohen, 2014). Data were analyzed using a mixed design 2 x 3 ANOVA with RCI-10 
score (high, low) as a between subjects factor and dilemma type (moral, conventional, 
neutral) as a within-subjects factor. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity was not violated (χ2(2) = 1.76, p < .416). The ANOVA revealed a non-
significant interaction, F(2, 33) = 0.800, p = .454, ηp
2
 =.024. The main effect for dilemma 
type was non-significant, F(2, 33) = 1.055 p = .354, ηp
2
 =.031. The main effect for RCI-
10 score type was also non-significant, F(2, 33) = 0.488, p = .508, ηp
2
 =.013. No 
significant mean differences were found to support my hypotheses.  
 
 
Figure 1. Electrode sites contributing to 
the N2 waveform. 
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Figure 2. Grand average N2 potentials at the frontal cluster (FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, 
CPz) for Moral and Conventional violations for participants with both High and Low 
RCI-10 scores. 
 
The data was then examined for possible hemispheric neuroprocessing 
asymmetries. This sort of lateralization analysis is a best practice in ERP research, as 
many neurocognitive functions are localized to one hemisphere, and hemisphere 
asymmetries of neurocognitive function have been a common finding in neuroscience for 
over 150 years (Luck, 2005).  Further, lateralization effects offer insight into how sensory 
stimuli are processed, and may provide additional information regarding my hypotheses. 
Previous studies suggested factors such as emotion and valence (Heller, 1993; Zhang, 
Zhou, & Oei, 2011) or specific characteristics about presented stimuli (Evans & 
Federmeier, 2007) were associated with differential processing across brain hemispheres. 
These factors are relevant to the current study, as emotion and valence have been found 
to produce differential processing of morally laden information (Decety and Cacioppo, 
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2012). Further, as was the case in Evans and Federmeier, the current study entailed verbal 
stimuli that were visually-presented, and thus, any hemispheric asymmetries found may 
be related to how distinctive characteristics of the stimuli are construed. Evans and 
Federmeier utilized ERP methodology in examining how the brain processes visually 
presented verbal information. These authors found the left hemisphere was associated 
with processing the visual stimuli more abstractly, whereas the right hemisphere more 
veridically.  
Scalp topographical plots were examined from the grand-averaged data for all 
participants. This revealed arguable N2 components at central electrodes directly lateral 
to midline. ERP data were averaged across a cluster of electrodes in the left hemisphere 
(electrodes C1 and FC1) and a cluster in the right hemisphere (electrodes C2 and FC2; 
see Figure 3). The medial electrodes (FCz, Cz, and Cpz) were eliminated from this  
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analysis, as their placement is not a lateralized position about the scalp. A mixed-design 2 
x 2 x 3 ANOVA with brain hemisphere (left, right) as a within-subjects factor, RCI-10 
score (high, low) as a between-subjects factor, and dilemma type (moral, conventional, 
neutral) as another within-subjects factor revealed a main effect of hemisphere, F(2, 1, 
33) = 10.2, p < .003, ηp
2
 = .236, such that N2 amplitudes for the right hemisphere were 
larger than for the left hemisphere for all violations. This was qualified by interactions 
between (a) hemisphere and dilemma type, F(2, 1, 33) = 3.99 , p = .023, ηp
2
 = .108, such 
that amplitudes for the neutral condition were significantly lower than more and 
conventional violations in the left hemisphere while not differing significantly from 
either in the right hemisphere; and between (b) hemisphere, dilemma type, and RCI-10 
score, F(2, 1, 33) = 3.21, p = .047, ηp
2
 = .089, such that the participants in the high 
religious commitment group produced larger amplitudes for moral violations in the right 
hemisphere than the low religious commitment group, with moral violations significantly 
higher than neutral violations, but not conventional violations. A main effect for dilemma 
type was non-significant, F(2, 1, 33) = 1.19, p = .308, ηp
2
 = .035 as was the main effect 
for RCI-10 score, F(2, 1, 33) = 0.25, p = .617, ηp
2
 = .008. The interaction between 
hemisphere and RCI-10 score was non-significant, F(2, 1, 33) = 0.72, p = .401, ηp
2
 = .022 
as was the interaction between dilemma type and RCI-10 score, F(2, 1, 33) = 0.86, p = 
.43, ηp
2
 = .025. Multiple within-subjects contrasts and examination of estimated marginal 
means plots were used to make post hoc comparisons between conditions. The first 
within subjects contrast examining the significant interaction of hemisphere, dilemma 
type, and RCI-10 score indicated there was a significant difference between moral and 
neutral dilemma types across brain hemispheres and RCI-10 scores, F= 6.054, p = .019,  
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Figure 4. Grand average N2 potentials at left (C1, FC1) and right (C2, FC2) hemispheres 
for Moral and Conventional violations for participants with High RCI-10 scores 
 
 
 
ηp
2
 = .155. This was significant at the Bonferroni-corrected α = .025. A follow up 2 x 3 
repeated measures ANOVA (hemisphere, dilemma type) was then conducted, revealing a 
non significant hemisphere by dilemma type interaction, F(1, 2) = 3.399, p = .039, ηp
2
 = 
.091 with a Bonferroni-corrected α = .0125. Coupling this finding with examination of 
the estimated marginal means plots revealed possible differences in means of dilemma 
types and hemispheres between religious commitment conditions. Additional 2 x 3 within 
subjects ANOVAs (hemisphere, dilemma type) were conducted examine possible 
difference between high and low religiously committed participants separately. The 
ANOVA examining the high religious commitment condition revealed a significant two 
way interaction, F(1, 2) = 5.854, p = .007, ηp
2
 =.281 at the Bonferroni-corrected α = 
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.0125, whereas the low religious commitment ANOVA revealed a non-significant 
interaction, F(1, 2) = 1.226, p = .305, ηp
2
 =.064. Simple contrasts for the ANOVA 
examining the high religious commitment group revealed an interaction of the difference 
between moral and neutral conditions and hemisphere of F = 8.365, p = .011, ηp
2 
= .358 
and an interaction of the difference between moral and conventional conditions and 
hemisphere of F = 3.680, p = .074, ηp
2 
= .197. However, neither of these contrasts were 
significant at the Bonferroni-corrected α = .00625. Given the lack of statistically 
significant results, evidence for a lateralized effect was not found, and no evidence was 
provided to support the hypotheses of the main analysis.    
Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Means for High RCI-10 Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Estimated Marginal Means for Low RCI-10 Scores 
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Table 1  
Estimated marginal means of N2 amplitude by religious 
commitment, dilemma type and hemisphere 
RCI-10 Dilemma Type Hemisphere M 
Std. 
Error 
Low 
Moral 
Left 1.65 .803 
Right 1.92 .794 
Conventional 
Left 1.98 .697 
Right 2.53 .747 
Neutral 
Left 1.78 .762 
Right 2.08 .764 
High 
Moral 
Left 2.65 .875 
Right 2.94 .865 
Conventional 
Left 2.44 .760 
Right 3.12 .814 
Neutral 
Left 1.45 .830 
Right 2.43 .833 
The results in bold represent significant RCI x Dilemma Type x 
Hemisphere interaction.  
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Discussion 
 In this study I examined how religious commitment impacts how the brain 
processes morally laden information, an important aspect in illuminating the relationship 
between religion and morality. This study contributes to extant literature on morality and 
religion in several ways.  First, the measures (RCI-10; Worthington et al., 2003) and 
constructs (i.e., domain theory; Turiel, 1983) utilized in the study were chosen for their 
demonstration of adequate reliability and validity. Moreover, specific aspects of morality 
and religion were examined, which circumvented a common drawback within the 
literature: that much of the literature investigating the relationship between religion and 
morality arrive to the discourse with dissimilar or general constellations of meanings for 
morality and religion (McKay & Whitehouse, 2015). Second, despite an exhaustive 
review of the literature, I was not able to find any existing research that utilized ERP 
methodology in investigating how the relationship between religious commitment and 
moral violations is processed neurocognitively. Third, the use of ERP is of particular 
import, as the temporal resolution afforded with this methodology allows for examination 
of rapidly occurring neural activations in automatic processes such as cognitive conflict 
detection. Finally, ERP methodology, as opposed to survey research, is a more direct 
study of the brain. The use of ERP circumvents the validity threats inherent to survey 
research (e.g., demand characteristics, social desirability bias; Heppner, Wampold, & 
Kivlighan, 2008).  
 It was expected that non-religiously committed individuals would have more 
cognitive conflict (i.e., greater mean N2 amplitudes) for conventional violations than 
religiously committed individuals. This hypothesis was not supported; according to the 
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ANOVA, no significant difference in mean N2 amplitudes was found during judgments 
of conventional violations across religious commitment types. Moreover, no significant 
differences were found across religious commitment types during judgments of moral 
violations.  
Though no significant differences were found with the ANOVA, examination of 
the waveforms from the frontal clusters (see Figure 2) may offer an alternative 
explanation of the findings that ANOVA may not be capable of detecting. Within the N2 
time window, the highly religiously committed participants did not appear to produce an 
N2 during judgments of moral or conventional scenarios, whereas the non-religiously 
committed participants did. In this context, the lack of an N2 component in the waveform 
would suggest the religiously committed participants did not experience cognitive 
conflict (i.e., two competing interpretations of incoming information; Cohen, 2014), 
while the non-religiously committed participants did. In this context, the lack of cognitive 
conflict for the religiously committed participants may be indicative of a more readily 
available schema, allowing information to be processed without the deliberation of 
competing interpretations (see below for further discussion of readily available schema).  
 Further, the lack of N2 component in the religiously committed participants’ 
waveform would also suggest the neural activity within this time window is likely the 
continuation of positive-going activity from the previous P2 component of the waveform. 
The P2 has been found to be an index of response to visual stimuli and as an index of 
implicit memory processing (Luck & Hillyard, 1994), with evidence demonstrating P2 
amplitudes are modulated by attentional resources (e.g., higher resources recruited when 
more attention is paid to a visual stimulus; Luck & Hillyard, 1994) and the context of 
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language for visually presented verbal stimuli (Evans & Federmeier, 2007; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1994). Accordingly, it may be more appropriate to interpret the highly 
religiously committed participants’ waveform as a P2 component rather than N2, as 
implicit memory processing may be indicative of accessing readily available schema or 
heuristics for interpretation of incoming information. However, the distinction of ERP 
components is beyond the scope of this study, and further research is needed to determine 
the accuracy of this interpretation. 
For religiously committed individuals, increased activation in the right 
hemisphere was found for both moral and conventional violations. Interpreted in the 
context of the P2 component, this suggests greater allocation of neural resources for the 
right hemisphere (Luck, 2005), but it may also suggest a difference in the manner in 
which specific characteristics about the information is processed. Evans and Federmeier 
(2007) found greater right hemisphere activation indicated more straightforward, 
veridical processing of visually presented information, whereas greater left hemisphere 
activation indicated more abstract processing. Taken together, this may suggest a 
tendency for religiously committed individuals to process morally laden information in a 
more undissembled, concrete, and fact-based manner, which is also indicative of 
someone with a more readily available schema to arbitrate information as it is presented.  
Worthington et al. (2003) stated this kind of accessible schema underlies the very 
concept of religious commitment—that religiously committed individuals possess these 
schemas and evaluate their everyday existence through them. Support for this assertion is 
consistent across the literature. Duriez (2003, 2004) found religious people are more 
likely than non-religious people to embrace traditions, order, and structure; espouse 
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culturally conservative, authoritarian beliefs; and ascribe importance to the expectations 
of authority figures when making crucial life decisions. Shariff, Piazza, and Kramer 
(2014) found theists believed their deity was the source of justice as well as being the 
author of morality itself, and Lupfer, Brock, and DePaola (1992) found religious 
participants tended to make more religious-heavy attributions to observed behavior (i.e., 
attributing behavior to “God” or “Satan” as causal agents) when they were more 
committed to their religion.  
Limitations  
 One limitation of this study was its cross-sectional nature, which did not allow for 
longitudinal examination of moral reasoning processes.  Future research should examine 
how these processes may change or develop over time due to biophysical variables (e.g., 
neuronal maturation or brain insult) or psychosocial variables such as changes in 
religious beliefs.  This study was also limited in that the participants were predominantly 
younger adult, female, and Caucasian. Moreover, most of those who identified as 
religious affiliated themselves as Roman Catholic. While this study (a) found no 
significant neural processing differences across gender, and (b) utilized the same age 
group on which the scenarios were normed, future research should utilize a more 
ethnically and religiously diverse sample of varying age and gender identification.   
Implications for Counseling Psychology and Directions for Future Research 
 Worthington et al. (2003) stated religious commitment should be considered when 
forming intervention strategies for clients, as religiously committed individuals view 
events from their lives in terms of their religious beliefs. I found coinciding evidence in 
the present study, as religiously committed individuals produced waveforms suggesting 
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they accessed readily available schemas and arrived at judgments without cognitive 
conflict. Considering this evidence, religiously committed clients may arrive at 
religiously aligned interpretations of life events readily and rapidly. Importantly, while 
religious belief is often highly associated with wellness, one’s interpretation of life events 
through a religious lens may also be potentially detrimental (Pargament, 2001). 
Pargament offers suggestions of how to work with potentially problematic religious 
interpretations of life events (i.e., negative religious coping) while remaining culturally 
sensitive with religious clients. This includes using Socratic dialogue or posing 
interposing competing tenets from within a client’s religious teachings. These efforts 
serve to  challenge a current interpretation in order to engender a different way of 
perceiving a given situation. However, the current findings would suggest interventions 
relying entirely on effortful or deliberate reasoning (e.g., Socratic dialogue) may not be as 
effective in challenging these interpretations as experientially oriented interventions 
might, if the interpretation occurs prior to conscious awareness. Future research should 
examine possible differences in treatment effectiveness in working with highly 
religiously committed clients.  
 Activism and Social Justice. Another implication pertains to activism and 
considerations of social justice. In their seminal paper, Vera and Speight (2003), called 
on all counseling psychologists to be grounded in a commitment to social justice. To this 
end, these authors included a call for expansion of our roles beyond that of counselor and 
psychologist to include activist. While understanding how therapy clients think and 
reason (including moral reasoning) is imperative, if counseling psychologists are to 
assume the role of activist, understanding moral psychology and moral reasoning will 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  51 
also be pivotal in understanding and addressing the foundations for the resistance that is 
likely to be encountered in pursuit of social justice ideals (Haidt, 2007). If, for instance, 
social justice ideals contravene a religious belief structure, mediating the resistance may 
require more than ratiocination or dialogue if individuals  arrive at opposing positions on 
a more implicit level of processing. 
 Disruptions in Moral Functioning. One salient point where understanding our 
client as meaning makers emerges is in addressing moral injury. Moral injury is a term 
coined to describe the disruption of deeply held beliefs about the world brought on by 
perpetrating, bearing witness to, or failing to prevent actions or inactions that challenge 
one’s moral code (Litz et al., 2009). The psychological consequences of moral injury are 
dire. Moral injuries are marked by functionally impairing levels of moral emotions (e.g., 
guilt and shame), self-handicapping behaviors (e.g., avoidance, substance abuse), 
demoralization, and self-harm, that are brought on when an event disrupts deeply held 
beliefs about how the world is and ought to be (i.e., moral beliefs; Litz et al., 2009; 
Farnsworth, et al., 2014). For many, these disrupted belief structures center on religious 
beliefs (Litz et al., 2009, Farnsworth, et al., 2014), and the findings of the present study 
offer a potential mechanism to explain how religiously themed moral injuries could result 
in adverse psychological outcomes. That is, morally injurious events may discompose 
previously readily available interpretations of incoming information, resulting in 
unresolved cognitive conflict that may actuate any number of psychological sequelae. 
Future research should endeavor to examine how this unresolved cognitive conflict might 
determine later processing and result in negative psychological outcomes.   
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Appendix A – Literature Review 
Morality is a perennial philosophical issue concerning the very nature of what is 
good. As humans, we have historically glorified our ability to reason, holding virtuous 
our ability to conquer our emotions and passions through logic and mental discipline 
(Haidt, 2013). Kohlberg (1976, 1981) embodied this reverence for rationalism in his 
foundational model of moral reasoning, however, research is emerging belying 
established conceptualizations of human moral functioning. Rather than reason alone, 
evidence now exists that our moral judgments occur as an interaction of other influences 
and processes (Greene et al., 2002; Haidt, 2001; Moll, 2005). Recently armed with brain 
imaging technologies such as electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), the body of moral neuroscience literature has burgeoned, increasing our 
understanding of the neural processes involved in moral functioning, and specifically 
with the use of event related potential (ERP) methods, the various inputs along the rapid  
time course of moral functioning are being revealed (Yoder & Decety, 2014).  
Religion was historically thought to be inextricably linked to morality, although 
recent studies have revealed a complex and even indirect relationship between morality 
and religiosity (Baumsteiger, Chennevile, & McGuire, 2014; McKay & Whitehouse 
2015). Presumably, both religious values and morality tap into individuals’ most deeply 
held beliefs and attitudes about the world, guiding thought and influencing action. Within 
a counseling environment, both religion and morality are of paramount importance as 
they are pivotal in informing the nature of a disorder, the aims for therapy, and the course 
of treatment (Benish, Quintana, & Wampold, 2011; Worthington, 1988). However, I was 
not able to find any existing research examining the neural correlates of morality and 
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religiosity, specifically with ERP methods allowing for the high temporal resolution 
necessary to examine the rapid sequential activation of neural areas in the  time course of 
moral processing.  
Moving from Rationalism 
With increased use of neuroscience technologies over the previous two decades, a 
growing body of literature has emerged examining how the brain processes morally laden 
stimuli (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al. 2005). This increase in information has led to a 
paradigm shift in our understanding of the processes of moral decision making  (Haidt, 
2013). The regnant model of moral decision making for much of the late previous century 
was the Kohlberg (1981) rationalist model of moral development. Kohlberg (1976) 
developed an interviewing method which he used with both adults and children to 
examine how they went about resolving hypothetical moral dilemmas. Kohlberg (1981) 
found that individuals’ development of moral reasoning occurs in increasing rational 
sophistication over six total stages. More specifically, he stated there are three levels 
(pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional) with two stages nested within 
each level. Kohlberg (1981) stated individuals begin their moral development as pre-
conventional children who are driven by egocentric motives and with judgments that are 
primarily concerned with how actions might bring about good or bad consequences to the 
self. As the child’s cognitive abilities expand, however, judgments about actions begin to 
involve incorporating the perspectives and interests of others. This increased 
development first allows for an understanding of others’ needs on a conventional level, 
then a more powerful and nuanced post-conventional level.  
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The differences among Kohlberg’s (1981) six stages of moral development lie in 
how individuals reason about the nature of justice and fairness. Kohlberg’s model stated 
the preconvention level centers on egoistic concerns, begins around age five, and is 
comprised of two stages: (a) the reward/punishment orientation and (b) the naïve 
reciprocity orientation (Bergen, 2008). At the preconventional level individuals’ 
interpretation of justice within the reward/punishment orientation is centered on the 
perceived reward or punishment that an action will bring about, and the naïve reciprocity 
orientation is centered on responding to good acts in kind or retaliating to acts that have 
caused harm (Bergen, 2008). The conventional level (Kohlberg, 1981) usually stabilizes 
around age 13 and is comprised of the two stages: (a) the good girl/boy orientation and 
(b) the authority or social order maintenance orientation (Bergen, 2008). The 
interpretation of justice within the good girl/boy orientation centers around maintaining 
approval of others through actions, and the authority and social order maintenance 
orientation centers on obeying authority and maintaining the social order as it is (Bergin, 
2008). Finally, individuals at the postconventional level begin to conceptualize justice 
and fairness in the abstract, developing more sophisticated and less egoistic senses of 
right and wrong (Kohlberg, 1981). Kohlberg found this level of moral reasoning usually 
develops in healthy individuals around ages 16 to 18. The two stages within the 
postconventional level are (a) the contract and democratic law orientation and (b) the 
conscience or principle orientation (Bergen, 2008). Interpretations of justice and fairness 
within the contract and democratic law orientation center around maximizing social 
welfare by fulfilling one’s duties as a citizen, and the conscience or principle orientation 
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centers on acting in ways that are guided by higher universal principles that maximize 
universal human rights (Bergen, 2008).  
Kohlberg’s model was not without criticism. Turiel (1983; 2008) expounded on 
differences between social conventions (i.e., rules that are culturally dependent, change 
across social groups, and serve to facilitate social coordination) and morals (i.e., 
universally held rules that are held above social and political authorities). Further, Turiel 
demonstrated that children were capable of distinguishing the difference between 
violations of morality and violations of social conventions as early as preschool, much 
earlier than Kohlberg (1981) described. Moreover, Smetana (2006) demonstrated this 
capability emerges in individuals as early as 39 months old.   
Other competing theoretical models were proposed in the latter part of the last 
century, which began subtly parsing the human moral experience into dissociable 
components (cf. Jones, 1991). For example, in Rest (1986) a four-component model of 
the psychological processes for healthy moral functioning was proposed. Moving beyond 
an emphasis on only moral judgment, the four components of Rest’s (1986) model are (1) 
moral sensitivity, referring to one’s ability to recognize a moral issue; (2) moral 
judgment, referring to the ability to arrive at a decision about an issue; (3) moral 
motivation, which entails placing moral concerns ahead of other concerns; and (4) moral 
character, which involves acting on one’s decision. Further, Blum (1994) expounded that 
moral sensitivity is comprised of other facets like moral perception, moral imagination, 
and empathy. Moral perception includes picking up relevant context-dependent cues to 
morally laden stimuli and is facilitated with increasing expertise; moral imagination 
entails the ability to envision different moral scenarios as well as the sequelae of each 
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moral action; and empathic sensitivity refers to one’s ability to perceive the emotional 
state of another person, triggering an emotional arousal to their experience, which often 
compels action (Blum, 1994).  
While Rest (1986) offered an expanded model that circumscribed other 
considerations of moral functioning, like Kohlberg (1981), Rest postulated moral 
judgment occurred only within the cognitive domain. In fact, Kohlberg, Levine, and 
Hewer (1983) contended that no single behavior has any particular moral standing unless 
it is driven by an explicit and deliberate moral judgment. This emphasis on cognitive 
processes during moral judgment drew criticism (Haidt, 2013; Wilson, 1993), as 
Kohlberg’s model was thought to myopically constrain moral functioning to reason 
alone. As will be explained in ensuing sections, a paradigm shift occurred to begin 
including other influences and processes (e.g., emotional processes, evolutionarily 
adapted sensitivities) involved in human moral functioning (Moll et al., 2005). As the 
body of research on human moral reasoning grew, several other empirically grounded 
theories of moral function arose (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; 
Moll et al., 2005; Waldmann & Dietrich, 2007), each espousing the notion that moral 
judgment occurs when a transgression or moral violation triggers a specific moral 
computation, but not necessarily within only a cognitive domain. For example, Greene et 
al. (2001) discovered brain areas associated with emotional processing were activated 
during moral reasoning tasks and are likely included in the moral reasoning calculus. He 
described a dual process model in which moral violations activate automatic, emotional 
processes that influence or even compete with controlled cognitive processes in arriving 
at a judgment. Haidt (2001) invoked social influence as well as affective processes with 
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his social intuitionist model. Similar to the dual process model, Haidt’s (2001) model 
stated that moral violations trigger an automatic, pre-cognitive intuition which is 
followed by ex post facto reasoning. Haidt stated these intuitions occur rapidly and 
without conscious deliberation, even possessing an affective valence about the situation.  
Moreover, he stated reasoning only occurs in the face of social pressures calling for one 
to explain the intuition. In other words, a judgment arises automatically and rapidly, and 
reasoning occurs more slowly and only when faced with social pressures calling for 
justification. Put simply, evidence was emerging that there is more to moral judgment 
than conscious reasoning alone.  
Moral Reasoning and Neuroscience 
Green et al. (2001) was pivotal in shifting focus toward examining moral 
functioning with objective neuroimaging technology. He utilized functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants deliberated hypothetical dilemmas. Two 
classic dilemmas were used for this study. The first was the Trolley dilemma where a 
runaway trolley careens down a track and is headed straight for five people on the track. 
The trolley will kill all five people unless a button is pressed to divert the trolley car to a 
different track. The only problem with pressing the button, however, is that there is one 
person on the other track who will inevitably be killed by the trolley. Herein lies the 
dilemma: should one do nothing and let five people die? Or, should one intervene and 
save the five people but kill one person? The other dilemma used in this study is called 
the footbridge dilemma. Like the trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley car is headed for five 
people, however, in this instance you and another large individual are atop a footbridge 
which spans the railroad tracks. The only way to stop the trolley and save the five people 
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would be to push the other person onto the tracks. The person you push onto the tracks 
would die in the process, but the other five people would live. In both dilemmas the same 
number of people would live or die, and yet, as Greene et al. (2001) summarized, most 
people are quick to agree with pushing a button to divert the trolley car, whereas most 
people hesitate to endorse pushing one person off the bridge to save many others. Greene 
et al. (2001) argued the difference lies in how dilemmas like the footbridge scenario 
engage emotional processing systems, preventing judgments from arising by pure reason 
alone. Greene and colleagues distinguished these dilemmas as moral-personal and moral-
impersonal, with the moral personal dilemmas activating emotional processes that 
compete with cognitive processes. Moreover, the authors stated utilitarian judgments 
(i.e., when the consequences of an action are used to justify the means of an action) to 
moral personal dilemmas, like the footbridge dilemma, are only possible when rational 
systems override the emotional coloring of the judgment.  
The use of fMRI served to establish the utility of neuroscience methods as a way 
to understand human morality in ways that would otherwise be impossible. But while 
seminal in shifting the paradigm of moral reasoning research, the moral-personal/moral-
impersonal distinction from Green et al. (2001) drew criticism as being too vague (Lotto, 
Manfrinati, & Sarlo, 2014; Moll et al., 2005). Lotto, Manfrinati, and Sarlo cited Thomas 
Aquinas’ (1952) Doctrine of the Double to explain the difference in emotion activation, 
which states that it is not allowable to intentionally cause harm for the greater good, but it 
is allowable if the harm to someone else is an unintentional but anticipated consequence. 
Lotto and his colleagues replicated the findings of Greene et al. (2001) but differed in that 
they parsed the difference in moral dilemmas not as moral-personal versus moral-
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impersonal, but as “instrumental,” in which another person’s well-being is used as an 
instrument in the dilemma’s resolution, versus “incidental,” where another person’s death 
is an unintentional but anticipated consequence in resolving the dilemma.  
Much of the research in moral science literature involves the use of dilemmas, as 
they are thought to evoke participants’ most deeply held attitudes and beliefs.  (Greene, 
2001; Kohlberg, 1967; Lotto, Manfrinati, & Sarlo, 2014). It should be noted, however, 
that the use of the classic footbridge and trolley dilemmas may be problematic. Turiel 
(2008) offered the criticism that these scenarios force participants to resolve a moral 
dilemma by committing a moral violation, which complicates how the moral judgments 
and deliberations may be interpreted. Consequently, findings based on these scenarios 
may not generalize to more mundane, but otherwise morally laden, dilemmas. Other 
dilemmas were developed to bypass this concern (e.g., Lahat, Helwig, & Zelazo, 2013), 
which entailed more commonplace social interactions that did not force participants to 
imagine committing a moral violation but still centered on issues of prevention of harm 
or maintenance of fairness. For example, Lahat and colleagues asked participants to judge 
(by indicating either “ok” or “not ok”) a resolution to a social interaction (e.g., a young 
boy is eating dinner with his family and started fighting).  
Another consideration in using dilemmas to examine moral functioning lies in 
how the scenarios are presented to the participant. Within the moral cognitive 
neuroscience literature, the scenarios tend to be either presented as a series of images 
depicting morally laden scenarios (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Escobar et al. 2014; Keil et 
al., 2002; Olafsson et al., 2008; Yoder & Decety, 2014) or narrative presentations of the 
dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1981; Lehat, Helwig, & Zelazo, 2013; Van Berkum et al., 2009). 
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Depicted moral scenarios allow for a swift presentation of the moral stimulus (Decety & 
Cacioppo, 2012), which conduces to research examining the time course and temporal 
dynamics of moral functioning. Further, a large body of moral neuroscience literature 
addresses the neural processing of pictures (Keil et al., 2002; Olafsson et al, 2008). 
However, narrative presentations confer advantages as well. Specifically, (a) language is 
a more precise way to make people think about abstract concepts and terms (Van 
Berkum, 2008), (b) more eye movements and neuroimaging artifacts will occur with 
picture presentations over screen-centered, word-by-word presentations (Luck, 2005), 
and (c) well-designed tests allow for temporally focused critical events in the input 
stream (Van Berkum et al., 2009).    
The body of moral neuroscience literature has seen profound growth in the 
previous 20 years. Early after the turn of the century, evidence converged to suggest 
agreement on the neural basis of human moral functioning (Moll et al., 2005). The review 
presented by Moll et al. drew from the most salient initial neural correlate studies, 
including brain lesion studies (e.g., Damasio, 1994) which showed individuals with 
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) were unable to incorporate affect 
in their moral decision making. Included also was Greene et al. (2001), who found that 
cognitive control processes occurred in the lateral PFC and the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), and emotional processing occurred in the medial PFC, posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), and the superior temporal sulcus (STS). Later studies supported these earliest 
findings (Chen et al. 2009; Escobar et al., 2014; & Yoder & Decety, 2012), and Moll et 
al.’s seminal review highlighted the convergence of the data, allowing for a more unified 
conceptualization of human morality’s neural basis. Specifically, Moll et al. indicated the 
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following neural areas are implicated in moral functioning: (1) the anterior PFC, which 
includes the frontopolar cortex; (2) the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), especially the medial 
sector; (3) the posterior STS, (4) the anterior temporal lobes, (5) the insula, (6), the 
precuneaus, (7), the ACC and PCC, and (8) limbic and paralimbic regions.  
Toward a neural model of human morality. Moll et al. (2005) was also pivotal 
in summarizing the extant theoretical frameworks that sought to account for variability in 
moral reasoning. In its nascence, the literature on moral neuroscience was a collection of 
inchoate and incomplete models. As will be described in the following section, there was 
a lack of agreement among theorists regarding constructs and terminology. Moll et al. 
was pivotal in that he combined the disparate literature into a concisely curated summary 
and integration. 
Somatic marker hypothesis. The first summarized framework, the somatic 
marker hypothesis, is primarily drawn from Damasio’s (1994) study of individuals with 
vmPFC damage. The participant’s inability to make felicitous moral decisions in their 
everyday lives despite being able to evaluate moral dilemmas in the abstract was thought 
to be a result of their lesioned vmPFCs. The somatic marker hypothesis asserts 
individuals with vmPFC damage are unable to automatically “mark” everyday morally 
laden decisions as either advantageous or pernicious. This hypothesis effectively 
integrated emotion and cognition while allowing for testable predictions, but it is limited 
in that it does not account for other neural areas implicated in moral functioning. Further, 
it does not account for different PFC areas that appear to have dissociable processes in 
moral functioning. 
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Social response reversal. Moll et al. (2005) then described the Blair and Cipolotti 
(2000) social response reversal framework, which sought to explain social behavioral 
impairments in patients with OFC lesions. Blair and Cipolotto (2000) were influenced by 
Rolls et al. (1994) who found that patients with OFC damage had difficulty with response 
reversal tasks. Rolls et al. described one response reversal task that included (a) having 
participants learn that touching one stimulus on a screen resulted in a reward while 
touching a different stimulus on a screen resulted in a punishment, and then (b) observing 
participants after the contingencies were unexpectedly reversed. The OFC is implicated 
in “rapid stimulus-reinforcement association learning as well as the correction of these 
associations when reinforcement contingencies in the environment change” (Rolls, 1996, 
p. 1437). Moreover, patients with OFC damage tend to make more errors on response 
reversal tasks (Rolls et al. 1994). Blair and Cipolotti examined a patient presenting with 
acquired sociopathy following trauma to the right frontal region which included OFC 
damage. The patient’s behavior was described as aberrant and marked by high levels of 
aggression and callousness toward others, and the patient was unable to recognize facial 
expressions of anger and disgust in others. However, the patient remained unimpaired in 
response reversal tasks. The unimpaired response reversal abilities led Blair and Cipolotti 
to argue for a social response reversal mechanism, which, in individuals with OFC 
damage would prevent the activation of a violence inhibition mechanism (VIM) when 
faced with the perception or expectation of another’s anger. The VIM, as described by 
Blair and Cipolotti is a product that emerges from a neural system involving the OFC and 
amygdala, marking the role of the amygdala in aversive conditioning and moral 
socialization. Further, these authors state that failures of VIM activation would be 
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endemic to developmental psychopathy and explain the instrumental aggression observed 
in this population. This model provides utility in its ability to predict behavioral outcomes 
as a result of OFC and amygdala damage, but it cannot account for deficits in moral 
functioning that stem from damage to other neural areas.  
Failure of theory of mind. A third framework described by Moll et al. (2005) was 
called “failure of theory of mind.” Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as one’s ability to 
understand the mental states (i.e., beliefs, intents, desires, etc.) of others, and to 
understand that these mental states are different from one’s own (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). The failure of theory of mind framework arose primarily from observing antisocial 
behavior and failure on ToM tasks seen in a patient with frontotemporal dementia 
(Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001). The patient’s brain exhibited bilateral atrophy of the 
OFC and anterior temporal lobes which included the amygdala. The personality changes 
and deficits of theory of mind resonate with what may be called abnormal moral 
functioning, specifically the ability to assume another’s perspective. However, this theory 
fails to account for all of the variation in antisocial behavior as theory of mind remains 
intact in individuals with psychopathy.  
Structured-event-complex framework. The structured-event-complex (SEC) 
framework (Grafman, 1995) relies on the assumption that executive functions performed 
by the PFC are based on sequence event knowledge that is stored in the PFC. SECs are 
defined as “long-term memories of event sequences that guide the perception and 
execution of goal-oriented activities” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 803), and can entail activities 
like planning a dinner party or all of the details and subroutines involved in going to the 
grocery store. Further the SEC framework predicts that different partitions of the PFC are 
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involved in storing different domains of event knowledge. Specifically, social and 
emotional SECs are associated with the vmPFC, novel and multitasking SECs are 
associated with the anterior PFC, and overlearned SECs like tying shoes are associated 
with more posterior regions of the PFC. This theory is crucial in its ability to account for 
long term and goal-oriented behavior, however, it is limited in that it cannot account for 
associations between the PFC and other neural areas, especially the limbic areas, in moral 
functioning. 
Moral sensitivity hypothesis. Studies involving showing participants’ depictions 
of moral violations (e.g., Moll, Oliveira-Souza & Eslinger, 2003) were shown to activate 
aPFC areas, medial OFC areas, the STS region, and brainstem and limbic structures. 
These automatic activations served to drive the moral sensitivity hypothesis: that humans 
are equipped to regard certain social events with moral values. This model converges 
with other moral reasoning studies implicating PFC and STS regions, however, it is 
limited in that it makes no predictions about the kinds of moral cognition impairments 
expected to see following damage to specific areas of the OFC, PFC, and STS.  
A comprehensive neural model of human morality. Integrating the strengths 
and circumventing the limitations of the frameworks into an overarching model, Moll et 
al. (2005) proposed the event-feature-emotion-complex (EFEC) framework. Moll and 
colleagues propounded the idea that three constructs interact to allow moral cognitive 
phenomena to emerge:  
1. Structured event complexes which are context-dependent representations of 
events and event sequences in the prefrontal cortex (PFC);  
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2. Social and functional features which is context-independent knowledge (i.e., 
semantic and featural knowledge) implicating the anterior and posterior temporal 
cortex; and     
3. Central motive and emotional states, which entail the context independent 
activation of motivational and emotional states in limbic/paralimbic structures.   
According to Moll et al. (2005), structured event knowledge is stored in different 
subdivisions of the PFC depending on the type of event knowledge, with novel and more 
difficult multitasking events associated with more anterior areas of the PFC (e.g., long-
term goals and multi-stage events like making plans and thinking about the future). Social 
and emotional event knowledge are associated with ventromedial PFC areas which are 
fundamental in formation of attitudes and social stereotypes, and overlearned sequences 
(e.g., tying one’s shoes or zipping a coat) are associated with medial and posterior PFC 
areas. Social perceptual and functional feature knowledge pertains to extracting social 
information (i.e., social perceptions, like facial expression, prosody of speech, gaze, body 
posture, and gestures) as well as functional features of the environment. These specific 
areas serve as a sort of social decoding mechanism, as navigating our everyday social 
worlds requires the processing of vast amounts of information in the form of countless 
moral appraisals. Information from the world is extracted and processed by these brain 
areas, giving rise to the moral appraisals necessary for navigating social situations, 
“social functional features code for context-independent semantic properties that are 
extracted from different social situations” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 805).  Finally, central 
motive states (e.g., aggression, guilt, shame, etc.) serve to provide emotional coloring as a 
basic mechanism for motivation. Researchers have found these motive and emotional 
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states are consistently associated with limbic and paralimbic areas (e.g., Decety & 
Howard, 2013; Greene et al., 2001). The feelings elicited from these areas also serve 
important social navigational functions. For instance, guilt may arise when someone 
perceives failure to uphold a societal standard, whereas pride may be experienced when a 
societal standard is perceived to be upheld.  
It is important to note the Moll et al. (2005) model of human moral cognition 
allows for the integration of culture with moral reasoning. It follows that religion, a 
salient cultural input, would dovetail into the model in at least two possible ways. First, it 
would inform the type of context-dependent structural event-knowledge stored in 
prefrontal areas, “the PFC has a central role in the internalization of moral values and 
norms through the integration of cultural and contextual information during 
development” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 804). Second, it would inform the context-
independent semantic knowledge housed in the pSTS during the extraction of social 
functional information in different social situations. 
Goncalves and Perrone-McGovern (2014) described a model possessing some 
functional overlap with the Moll et al. (2005) model. For example, Goncalves and 
Perrone-McGovern implicated the vmPFC and temporal parietal junction (also reported 
in the literature as the pSTS [Decety & Caccioppo, 2012]) as a components of the Default 
Mode Network.  
“the social cognition network is a Default Mode Network connecting the 
mechanisms involved in spontaneous rest activity between the temporal parietal 
junction, posterior cingulate cortex, and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, areas of 
the brain that are associated with self-representation and theory of mind 
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processes.  Disruption of these networks has symptomatic expressions such as 
social inadequacy, attachment deficits, or lack of empathy (e.g., Autistic 
Spectrum Disorders)” (Goncalves & Perrone-McGovern, 2014; p. 509).  
Though not specifically a moral reasoning model, attachment deficits and lack of 
empathy are distinguishing characteristics of deficient moral functioning (Decety & 
Howard, 2013). Moreover, this functional overlap speaks to affective and cognitive 
inputs that may be necessary to moral reasoning (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Greene et 
al., 2001). Furthering this point, Decety and Cacioppo cautioned against considering the 
function of these brain areas as unique to moral reasoning, “moral reasoning seems to be 
underpinned by specific neural circuitry, but, in fact, these circuits…involve regions and 
systems underlying specific affective states and cognitive and motivational processes” (p. 
3068).   
The virtue of event-related potentials 
The identification of the underlying brain areas was an essential first step in 
understanding the cognitive neuroscience of human moral functioning. This first step was 
also important for counseling psychologists because it offers at the very least a 
biophysical marker for specific deficits in healthy personal and interpersonal functioning. 
Moreover, with these underlying components identified, an examination of the temporal 
dynamics (i.e., how these areas activate in sequence over time when processing morally 
laden information) became possible. Neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI were crucial 
in identifying the neural areas of human moral cognition, however, their utility is limited 
in that these techniques have very low temporal resolution and may fail to capture all of 
the activations—and sequences of activations—of neural areas and systems in the rapid 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  81 
time course of moral reasoning (Yoder & Decety, 2014). As such, it may be of limited 
utility in examining how the components of the Moll et al. (2005) model activate in 
sequence to produce moral functioning. Indeed, the prefrontal areas implicated in the 
aforementioned moral reasoning models are activated very rapidly post stimulus onset. 
During moral reasoning tasks Decety and Cacioppo (2012) found the vmPFC was 
activated between 182-304 ms post stimulus, and Lahat, Helwig, and Zelazo (2013) 
found general activation of prefrontal areas between 200-500ms post stimulus. 
Considering this limitation, electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques, specifically those 
examining event-related potentials (ERPs) may be uniquely suited to examine moral 
reasoning’s rapid time course, as the temporal resolution of these techniques can be at the 
1 ms level (Yoder, & Decety, 2014).  
Yoder and Decety (2014) demonstrated the immense utility inherent to ERP as 
they were able to show how processes once thought to be inextricably linked may 
actually be activated at separate points in the time course of moral functioning. 
Specifically Yoder and Decety found that areas implicated in valence appraisal were 
activated prior to activation of areas implicated in emotional processing. In other words, 
their study suggested people judge stimuli as good or bad prior to any emotional coloring 
of the reasoning process. This finding has profound implications for our understanding of 
human morality. Specifically, it suggests valence appraisal to be evolutionarily adaptive 
in how we navigate our world, it opens the door for examination of possible influences 
and inputs not otherwise understood to be part of our moral calculi, and it speaks to the 
importance of examining the temporal dynamics of moral functioning with high temporal 
resolution (Yoder & Decety, 2014).  For example, Moll et al. (2005) posited cultural 
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information shapes moral functioning. If, however, cultural inputs such as one’s religion 
shape and influence moral functioning, fMRI may be unable to isolate the neural areas 
and systems involved if they activate more rapidly than the temporal resolution afforded 
by fMRI.   
What is ERP? Having made the case for ERP’s utility in investigating the time 
course of human moral functioning, a discussion about the nature of ERP is warranted. 
Brain ERPs are a detection of the electric field generated on the scalp by the movement 
of ions within neural mass in fixed temporal relation to the arrival of information or 
movement (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). ERPs must be distinguished from evoked 
potentials which reflect sensory processing; ERPs evaluate neural activity in response to 
a certain event (Hruby & Marsalek, 2003). Further, ERP research is predicated on the 
premise that psychological processes leading to the completion of a certain task require 
changes in content of thought and attention, and these are evident in changes of electrical 
activity that neural systems generate (Hruby & Marsalek, 2003). 
ERPs are measured with the use of electroencephalography (EEG), which entails 
placing electrodes in specific places about the scalp using a conductive gel (Landa et al., 
2014). The EEG data is examined before, during, or after stimulus onset, and potential 
differences between pairs of electrodes (with one electrode recording) are sampled 
several hundred times per second (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). Electric scalp fields vary 
over time in both strength and location, providing a topography of electrical activity, and 
offering spatial and temporal information about processing in relation to time-locked 
stimuli (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). Time-locked stimuli are important to ERP research 
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because ERPs are reported as an average of multiple EEG readings from multiple 
exposures to the same stimulus.  (Landa et al., 2014).  
 The N2 Component. Time windows of ERPs are subdivided into components. 
Peaks and troughs of the waveforms are traditionally thought of as components that 
reflect maximal activation of brain processes in response to the stimulus (Brandeis & 
Lehmann, 1986). Past researchers have established that the N2 component is a negative-
going wave that peaks between 200 and 350 ms post stimulus onset and is an index of 
cognitive conflict detection (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). Cognitive conflict occurs 
when multiple competing actions are considered, with only one of these actions being 
selected as the appropriate course of action (Cohen, 2014). The N2 is usually generated at 
medial-frontal sites and is larger when cognitive conflict is high (Azizian, Freitas, Parvaz, 
& Squires, 2006; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive conflict, 
as detected by N2 activation, has been commonly studied with the use of go/no-go tasks 
that entail a tendency to make prepotent but incorrect responses (Donkers & van Boxtel, 
2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). However, the N2 is not elicited specifically to go/no-go 
tasks. Botvinick et al. reviewed the literature on N2 as an index of cognitive conflict 
monitoring with studies using response competition, adjustments in perceptual selection, 
and maintenance of contextual information. Lahat, Zelwig, and Zelazo (2013) also 
observed N2 activation in both children and young adults during tasks that involved 
judging morally laden scenarios. Source localization analyses have implicated ventral 
PFC areas (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex) and dorsomedial PFC areas (e.g., dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex [ACC]) during N2 activation (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003).  
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It should be expected, then, that N2 components will be observed over frontal 
brain areas during moral reasoning tasks, as these tasks likely require participants to 
weigh potentially competing information. That is, moral reasoning tasks may require 
weighing potentially competing interests between parties. Moreover, it should be 
expected that with higher cognitive conflict (e.g., the greater the number and profundity 
of considerations), higher N2 amplitudes would be observed.   
Brain Hemisphere Asymmetries. An important aspect in examining how the 
brain processes information (e.g., ERP studies) lies in how the brain’s hemispheres often 
process stimuli differently. Previous studies suggested factors such as emotion and 
valence (Heller, 1993; Zhang, Zhou, & Oei, 2011), or specific characteristics about 
presented stimuli (Evans & Federmeier, 2007) were associated with differential 
processing across brain hemispheres. Evidence of brain processing asymmetries for 
specific tasks arose as early as the mid 1800s with Broca’s groundbreaking work on the 
localization of language production (Joynt, 1966). Broca localized a specific area of the 
brain (i.e., Broca’s Area) after examining two patients who had both lost their ability to 
speak after suffering insult to the same neural area in the left hemisphere. Neural 
processing asymmetries are many (Hellige, 1993), and among the most germane to the 
current study are the ones produced during visual perception and language 
neurocognitive tasks. Neuroscience research on visual perception asymmetries emerged 
as early as 50 years ago, as Kimura (1966) discovered the left and right hemispheres 
produce differential processing of visual information. Kimura presented participants with 
random successions of letters or non-alphabetical stimuli to either the right or left visual 
fields. Kimura found that participants were able to more accurately identify letters when 
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presented in the right visual field, whereas the non-alphabetical stimuli was more 
accurately identified when presented in the participants’ left visual fields. These findings 
suggested the left hemisphere functioned to identify verbal-conceptual forms, while the 
right hemisphere served to register nonverbal stimuli. Put simply, these findings 
suggested both hemispheres are involved in the processing and remembering of visually 
presented stimuli, but that the hemispheres cull different kinds of information from the 
same stimuli. More recently, Evans and Federmeier (2007) utilized ERP methodology to 
examine the time course of hemispheric asymmetries during a verbal memory task. In 
their task, Evans and Federmeier presented participants with 567 nouns, each with a 
length of 4-6 letters that were selected for their frequency of use in the English language. 
These words were randomly presented in a serial fashion on either the right or left side of 
a computer screen, and a random selection of these words were repeated during the task 
at random intervals. The participants were asked to (a) fix their gaze on a cross in the 
center of the screen while the words were presented, then (b) respond “yes” if the word 
being presented had been displayed previously or “no” if it was the first presentation of 
the word. Evans and Federmeier found that stimuli processed in the right hemisphere 
(i.e., presented in the left visual field) were more accurately identified during the task 
overall, but that P2 component potentials (an index of implicit memory processing) were 
greater in left hemisphere. This suggested the left hemisphere processed visually 
presented verbal stimuli with more abstract processes, while the right hemisphere is 
involved in more veridical processing.  
Religion and Differential Neural Processing 
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Moll et al. (2005) called for an examination of how culturally shaped values and 
preferences may influence social interactions. Religion is one such cultural input 
(Baumsteiger, Chenneville, & McGuire, 2014). Moreover, religion has been associated 
with differential neural processing (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, 2009). For 
example, Inzlicht and colleagues found evidence suggesting religion may produce an 
emotionally palliative effect. These authors utilized EEG and compared ERP data of 
participants with varying levels of religious zeal as they completed the Stroop color-
naming task (MacLeod, 1991), a task designed to be mentally difficult. These authors 
utilized an eight-item measure of religious zeal (McGregor, Haji, Nahs, & Teper, 2008; α 
= .75), defined as a fervent and even fanatical form of belief marked by intolerance of 
dissent. It was found that higher levels of religious zeal were related to lower error-
related neural responses. Further, source localization of this ERP data coincided with the 
N2 cognitive conflict detection literature, as these findings were a product of differential 
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).   
Having established religion’s association with differential neural processing, a 
basis is provided to search for other possible ways that religion may affect neural 
processing. Given the inconsistent findings in the literature relating morality and religion 
(Baumsteiger, Chenneville, & McGuire, 2014), neuroscience techniques, specifically 
ERP examination, may be well-suited to provide another layer of insight, as they provide 
objective, high-temporal-resolution accounts of neural processing.  
Purpose and Importance of the Study 
 The present study examined how the brain processes social interactions entailing 
a moral violation, social conventional violation, or no violation, and the role of religion in 
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influencing neural response when providing judgments of these interactions.  
Specifically, I examined the effect of religious commitment and the type of dilemma 
(conventional or moral) on the amount of neural resources needed to make a judgment 
about the dilemma. Understanding this relationship is a crucial initial step toward 
understanding the processes involved in the zone of mediation where we—and our 
clients—make meaning of our experience.   
Religion and Morality 
Religion and morality reflect an individual’s deepest held attitudes and beliefs, 
and both may tap into and inform personal beliefs about right and wrong. However, there 
is disagreement on whether religion relates to morality at all. A recent Pew poll found 
that a majority of individuals believe morality cannot exist without religion (Pew 
Research Center, 2007). This notion was espoused by William James (1902) when he 
stated clearly that an authentic religious life should be judged by its moral helpfulness. 
Baggini (2003), however, contended morality exists independent of religion, stating that 
in as far as morality emerges from empathy, a sense of caring, and anger at injustices in 
the world rather than fear of punishment, religious individuals and atheists uphold the 
same moral values.  
This inconsistency also emerges within the moral psychology literature. Kohlberg 
(1967) claimed morality and religion were discrete domains independent of one another. 
Speaking to this point, Walker (2003) stated religious considerations, even if they did 
contribute to moral reasoning, were omitted across much of moral psychology because 
religion tended to be conceptualized as a domain independent from morality. Walker then 
cited several qualitative case studies of identified moral exemplars, the bulk of whom 
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attributed their consistent morally virtuous behavior to values derived from their religious 
faith. 
The inconsistency emerges in the empirical literature as well. In an investigation 
of the decision styles of religious individuals using self-report measures of religiosity and 
motivated social cognition, Duriez (2003, 2004) found that religious people are more 
likely than non-religious people to embrace traditions, order, and structure; espouse 
culturally conservative, authoritarian beliefs; and ascribe importance to the expectations 
of authority figures when making crucial life decisions. Other research suggested a more 
direct relationship between religious experience and morally relevant behavior. For 
example, when participants were implicitly primed with religious representations (e.g., 
words like “God”) they score higher on measures of generosity in economic games and 
were less likely to cheat as opposed to neutrally primed participants (Randolph-Seng & 
Nielsen, 2007). Banerjee, Heubner, and Hauser (2010) provided further evidence of a 
direct relationship between religion and moral reasoning, as they sampled 8778 
participants across four factors (gender, education, politics, and religion) and analyzed 
their responses to moral dilemmas in unfamiliar situations. These authors found that 
people who identified as religious gave more deontological/rule-based judgments than 
atheists. In other words, participants who were less religious tended to judge the actions 
or inactions described in the moral dilemmas as more permissible. It should be noted; 
however, Banerjee, Heubner, and Hauser cautioned against embracing this direct 
relationship because, although it was statistically significant, the effect size was 
extremely low.  
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Research investigating perceptions of religious and nonreligious individuals is 
also inconsistent. Wright and Nichols (2014) demonstrated a tendency for individuals to 
conflate religion with morality when appraising the actions of others. Participants in this 
study appraised morally laden behavior of both atheists and Christians. Despite identical 
actions committed by both atheists and Christians, participants consistently ascribed more 
positive appraisals to Christians and more negative appraisals to atheists. Further, 
participants also deemed moral behavior to be more consistent with Christians and 
immoral behavior to be more consistent with atheists. Gervais (2014) investigated 
perceptions of good deeds that were performed as a result of either religious motivations 
or as an end itself. Counter to Wright and Nichols, Gervais found that across six studies 
(n =1,078), participants (identifying as both religious and nonreligious) viewed good 
deeds as less moral when they were performed out of religious motivations. Interestingly, 
this tendency was found even when the religiously motivated deed was identical to a deed 
performed without religious motivation.  
Other research describes a more complex relationship with moral reasoning. 
Baumsteiger, Chenneville, and McGuire (2014) sampled 1037 college students who 
completed measures of religiosity, spirituality, and the ethics position questionnaire 
(EPQ; Forsyth, 1980), a scale tapping into two facets of moral reasoning (idealism and 
relativism). It was found that moral idealism related positively to religiosity, however, 
religiosity accounted for very little of the variance in moral reasoning. Taken together, 
this suggested religious individuals may be more idealistic in that they are likely to 
believe the best outcomes across all situations can be achieved without any harming 
anyone.  
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The research relating morality and religion has long been inconsistent, especially 
research examining a direct relationship between the constructs of religion and morality 
(McKay & Whitehouse, 2015). McKay and Whitehouse posited the issue underlying the 
inconsistency in the literature pertains to overarching conceptual differences in the 
constructs of religion and morality from competing theoretical camps. McKay and 
Whitehouse also proposed the inconsistencies in the literature can be avoided by 
fractionating the constructs of religion and morality into coherent biological and 
psychological components.  
Indeed, associations have long been found between components underlying the 
constructs of religion and morality. Batson et al. (1989) found that cognitive components 
of moral reasoning related to religiosity, as it was found that individuals who question 
their own faith but feel compelled to find religious certainty tend to use the higher 
reasoning levels in the Kohlberg (1981) model than religious individuals. Similarly, 
Wahrman (1981) found that adherence to religious dogma related negatively with 
increased levels of moral judgment on the defining issues test (Rest, 1979), another 
widely used measure of moral reasoning development.  
Batson (1976) differentiated between three types of religious orientations (means, 
ends, & quest) that may elucidate some of the differences in how religion relates to 
morality. A means orientation represents a utilitarian, self-serving attitude which one uses 
to provide self-justification as well as serving as a symbol for their way of life, an ends 
orientation represents a religious attitude in which one’s faith is the primary value and 
primary motivator for living, and the quest orientation represents someone who continues 
to seek answers to questions regarding the meaning of life. Sapp and Gladding (1989) 
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utilized the Batson distinction to examine how these orientations might relate to one’s 
moral reasoning. Sapp and Gladding found a significant negative relationship between 
the ends orientation and levels of moral judgment, which contravened their hypothesis 
that it would be positive and countered the previously held assumption that a life devoted 
to one’s faith would relate to one’s level of morality. This finding suggested the 
relationship between religion and morality might have more to do with conformity and 
adherence to orthodoxy rather than concerns of upholding fairness and preventing harm. 
However, while this study does lend validation to the Batson tripartite religious 
orientation model, moral reasoning is conceptualized in a purely rational sense and 
without any influence of the criticisms of the rationalist moral reasoning models that 
would arise in the years following publication. Moreover, the rationalistic models of 
moral reasoning may even preclude deeply religious people from attaining the highest 
level of reasoning because their highest moral pursuits may not center on justice and 
fairness (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
More recent research also has found associations between components of religion 
and morality (cf. Shariff, Piazza, & Kramer, 2014). Shariff and colleagues summarized 
the meta-analytic literature examining similarities and differences between theists and 
nontheists and found that, overall, theists and nontheists differed in meta-ethical beliefs 
and cognitive styles. Importantly, these authors stated these differences drive differences 
in how morality is construed. For instance, these authors stated those who believe in a 
deity are distinguished from nontheists in that they not only consider their deity to be the 
source of justice, but the author of morality itself. Further, they stated differences emerge 
when examining how theists and nontheists approach resolving moral issues.  
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Specifically, Shariff and colleagues stated theists tended toward moral objectivism, where 
only one person could be correct in a moral disagreement, whereas nontheists find 
morality to be culturally relative and more subjective.   
Religious commitment and religious schemas. Across the literature, it appears a 
relationship is found between religion and moral reasoning when religion becomes 
ingrained into one’s experience, such that it shapes and colors perceptions and cognitions. 
Worthington (1988) put forth a model to address the variation in the ability of one’s 
religious experience to account for differences in levels of mental health. This model may 
also tap into ingrained religious experience, as it is predicated on the notion that the more 
religiously committed a person is, the more that person would evaluate their world on 
religious dimensions according to their religious values. The key component of the 
Worthington model is religious commitment, which is defined as “the degree to which a 
person adheres to his or her religious values, beliefs, and practices and uses them in daily 
living” (Worthington et al., 2003; p. 85). Further this model contends the differences 
between highly religiously committed individuals compared to non-religious 
individuals—or even moderately religious people—lies in how highly religious 
individuals use more religious cognitive constructs or religious schemas. Studies 
supporting this theory include Lupfer, Brock, and DePaola (1992), who found that 183 
participants varying in their commitment to conservative Christianity tended to make 
more religious-heavy attributions to observed behavior when more committed to his or 
her religion. Another study supporting the increased use of religious schema found that 
the belief systems of 1,475 Protestant and Catholic were most differentiated along 
schematic/aschematic dimensions when identified as highly religious (Lau, 1989).   
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Hardy et al. (2012) found moral identity mediated the relationship between moral 
behavior and religious commitment in adolescents. Adolescent participants (n = 502) 
ranging in age from 10- to -18 years of age provided answers to measures assessing 
degrees of religious commitment, religious involvement, empathy, and aggression.  
Structural equation modeling revealed religious commitment indirectly related to 
aggression (in a negative direction) and empathy (in a positive direction), with moral 
identity serving to mediate these relationships. This finding suggests morality is 
influenced by religiosity when one’s morality is more central to their sense of identity. 
The construct of religious commitment has been construed, operationalized, and 
measured in many ways over the last 60 years, including belief in religious creeds, level 
of engagement in religious activities, attitudes and importance of religious experience, 
and membership status in religious organizations (Hill & Hood, 1999). Perhaps the 
earliest formal study of this construct was Glock (1962), who eventually developed a 
five-dimensional model of religious commitment (Glock & Stark, 1966). Glock and 
Stark’s religious commitment dimensions are (a) ideological (beliefs), (b) intellectual 
(knowledge), (c) ritualistic (overt behavior traditionally defined as religious), (d) 
experiential (experience defined as religious in the sense of fomenting emotions or 
feelings), and (e) consequential (the effects produced by the other four dimensions when 
applied in the secular world). Though foundational in setting the stage for stage for 
examining notions of religious commitment, drawbacks of this model include (a) it was 
developed with only Judaic and Christian religious traditions in mind, and (b) it centers 
predominantly on how individuals adhere to traditional doctrines (Worthington et al., 
2003). While Worthington and colleagues’ operationalization of religious commitment 
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shares many similarities with previous conceptualizations (e.g., examination of intrinsic 
religious motivation), it expands the definition to include the employ of religiously 
themed perceptions or readily available schema to filter incoming sensory information 
from the world.   
Summary 
 Overall, the body of research examining the relationship between religion and 
morality is inconsistent. The research that does indicate a direct relationship is tenuous, 
and other research describes a relationship that is complex at best or indirect. Further, It 
should be noted that the research to date comparing religion and morality relies almost 
entirely on self-report measures, which are fraught with threats to validity (e.g., social 
desirability bias, response bias; Heppner, Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008) and are 
incapable of detecting the influences of moral functioning that occur outside of conscious 
awareness. For example, neural areas implicated for valence appraisals and affective 
processing have been found to activate rapidly following morally laden stimuli (i.e., 
within 100ms post stimulus; Yoder & Decety, 2014). Moreover, many discriminatory 
attitudes operate at unconscious levels (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1988), but 
nevertheless may be involved in moral functioning. For example, Moll et al. (2005) stated 
the PFC areas implicated in SECs are fundamental in forming discriminatory attitudes 
and beliefs. Using neuroscience techniques like EEG to examine ERPs are a way to 
circumvent the subjectivity inherent to self report measures while providing the ability to 
examine the neural mechanics of moral functioning that occurs rapidly and outside of 
conscious awareness (Yoder & Decety, 2014).  
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Coupling the inconsistent findings in the research relating religion and morality 
with the reliance within the research on self-report measures (which may be problematic), 
an objective measure, such as a biophysiological marker, may prove indispensable in 
elucidating the intricately complex relationship between religion and morality.  To the 
best of this researchers knowledge, there are no studies examining how religion or 
religious commitment might be related to differences in neural processing during moral 
reasoning tasks. As stated previously, one article was found which investigated the 
association of religion and neural processing (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh & Nash, 2009). 
These authors examined ERP data and found that those scoring higher on measures of 
religious zeal may experience lower levels of error-related negativity when committing a 
conspicuous error. However, no research was found examining how one’s religious 
commitment might produce differential neural processing during judgments of moral or 
social conventional dilemmas. Considering (a) the contemplation of these sorts of 
situations are tantamount to experiencing the world and making meaning of it (Hayes, 
1994), (b) navigating a social world requires several of these judgments be made every 
day (Moll et al., 2005), and (c) cultural inputs, like religion, may shape and color how 
moral and social conventional considerations are processed and construed into meaning 
(Moll et al., 2005), this research is warranted. If indeed a difference in N2 amplitude 
exists, it would suggest a difference in automatic processing across groups. It would also 
suggest activation of perceptual functional features as described in Moll et al. (2005). 
This sort of objective investigation may be what is necessary to more fully elucidate the 
nature of the relationship between moral reasoning and religious commitment. Moreover, 
as will be explained in the next section, this elucidation will be a necessary first step in 
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untangling some the complex intricacies of how individuals take information from the 
world and ultimately make meaning of it.  
ERP may be uniquely suited to illuminate differences in moral reasoning because 
of its objective nature, and because of its ability to examine attention capture and level of 
effort or attentional resources allocated to specific regions of the brain.  Moreover, it 
allows for examination of these spatiotemporal neurodynamic properties with high time 
resolution. If, however, no significant results are found, it would provide objective 
evidence to bolster the findings in the literature suggesting little to no relationship exists 
between religion and morality (Baumsteiger, Chennevile, & McGuire, 2014). Further, no 
significant results found would suggest what Banerjee, Heubner, and Hauser (2010) 
describe as “a distinctively moral faculty that operates independently of the deliberative 
and emotional mechanisms that play a central role in much of our more reflective and 
evaluative lives” (p. 276).  
Implications for counseling psychology.  As counseling psychologists, 
understanding how our clients think and reason is tantamount to understanding our clients 
as meaning makers. Kohlberg (1967) stated the cognitive processes involved in thinking 
and reasoning are, in essence, a relating of events where knowledge and information from 
the world are put together. Importantly, this reasoning encompasses the complete range 
of situations requiring thinking, judgment, and reasoning, from everyday mundane 
decisions to the more difficult dilemmas that may result in inevitable harm to oneself or 
to another. Kegen (1982) elaborated this point, stating that in order to understand our 
clients, reasoning must be viewed as an active relating and experiencing of the world 
rather than merely what the client knows: “to understand a client is to enter into that 
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region between an event and a reaction to it—the place where it actually becomes an 
event for that person” (Kegen, p. 2). Hayes (1994) augmented this point, stating that 
when reasoning occurs, it is in fact our clients experiencing, understanding, and making 
meaning of the world.  Hayes stated, “it is in this zone of mediation that counselors help 
clients to make better meaning of their experience” (p. 262). Indeed, clients will face 
countless judgments in their everyday experience (Moll et al., 2005), including salient 
reasoning and judgment situations in the counseling room, such as examining personal 
motives, deciding what one should or would do, and contemplating hypothesized 
outcomes of acts that may affect others (Hayes, 1994).  However, as was described in 
previous sections, moral functioning entails more components than reasoning alone, and 
examining the relationship between religion and moral considerations remains difficult 
when relying on self-report methodology alone. If counseling psychologists are to truly 
understand clients as meaning makers, it will require a direct study of the brain during 
moral functioning, as moral functioning is tantamount to clients interacting with 
information from the world and making meaning of it. By examining the role of religious 
commitment and type of dilemma presented to participants, I hope to answer the call to 
action put forth by Gonçalves and Perrone-Mcgovern (2014) and to provide a 
foundational understating of the neural mechanisms underlying reasoning. Understanding 
this relationship will be a crucial initial step toward understanding the processes involved 
in the zone of mediation where we—and our clients—make meaning of our experience.   
Definition of Important Terms 
Moral Domain.  The moral domain is structured by notions that center on 
fairness, reciprocity, and prevention of harm (Turiel, 1983, 2008). Moral violations entail 
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a disruption or a failure to behave or make choices that are consistent with these notions 
of fairness and prevention of harm. Turiel also defined moral considerations as being 
immutable and unbound across cultures and societal norms.  
 Social Conventional Domain.  The social conventional domain is structured by 
the conception of rules that are culturally dependent, change across social groups, and 
serve to facilitate social coordination (Turiel, 1983, 2008). Turiel also stated social 
conventional considerations differ from moral considerations in that these notions may be 
altered to align with changing social consensus or to align with a respected authority.   
Event-Feature-Emotional Complexes (EFECs).  EFECs are the product that 
emerges from the interaction of the brain areas involved in human moral functioning 
(Moll et al., 2005). The brain areas involved in EFECs are associated with event 
knowledge, social perceptual and functional information, and affective influence, and 
these interact to produce a complex that binds moral coloring to the human conscious 
experience (Moll et al., 2005).   
 Religious Commitment.  Religious commitment was defined as the degree to 
which individuals use their matrix of religious beliefs in their everyday experience 
(Worthington, 2003). Worthington stated the assumption underlying the concept of 
religious commitment is that those scoring high in religious commitment evaluate the 
world through religious schemas, thus integrating their religion into much of their daily 
lives.  
 
Appendix B – Informed Consent for Participants 
Study Title: How the Brain Responds to Reasoning Tasks 
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Study Purpose and Rationale 
The purpose of this research project is to examine patterns of brain activity during 
reasoning tasks, specifically the relationship between religious commitment on reasoning 
tasks describing moral and social conventional violations.   
 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
To be eligible to participate in this study, you must be at least 18 years old and be 
enrolled in a CPSY undergraduate course.  
 
Participation Procedures and Duration 
For this project, you will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires assessing 
demographic information and factors that may influence neurological activity (e.g. 
history of concussion, medications, history of anxiety). You will also be asked to 
complete a questionnaire assessing your level of religious commitment. You will then be 
prepared for an electroencephalograph (EEG) recording session and your brain activity 
will be measured while completing several computerized tasks. For the EEG recording 
you will be asked to wear a tight cloth cap and electrodes will be secured to the cap and 
to several locations on the face using a non-toxic gel. The computerized tasks you will be 
asked to complete involve reading a series of scenarios and making decisions by 
providing ok/not ok. While you perform the computerized tasks, your neural activity will 
be recorded in the next room and your progress will be monitored using a video camera. 
The video feed is passive and will not be recorded. The experiment should take 
approximately 1 ½ to 2 hours to complete.   
 
Data Confidentiality or Anonymity 
Data collected during this study will remain confidential and no identifying information 
such as names will appear in any publication or presentation of the data.   
 
Storage of Data 
Informed consent documents and survey responses will be stored in the faculty advisor’s 
research lab. Data collected via computer will be entered into a software program and 
stored on the researcher’s password-protected computer. Collected data will kept for an 
indefinite amount of time for the purpose of future research analyses. Only members of 
the research team will have access to the data. 
 
Risks or Discomforts 
There are no anticipated risks associated with participating in the current study. However, 
it is possible you may feel some discomfort while being prepared for the EEG recording. 
Gel will be placed in holes in the cap and will get into your hair. The gel is non-toxic and 
washes out easily with a shower. You may quit the study at any point you feel 
uncomfortable or do not wish to continue. 
 
Who to Contact Should You Experience Any Negative Effects from Participating in 
this Study 
Should you experience any feelings of anxiety, there are counseling services available to 
you through the Ball State University Counseling Center in Muncie, 765-285-1736. 
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Benefits 
Participants will receive credit in CPSY undergraduate course for participating in 
fulfillment of partial course requirements. Participants will receive research credits equal 
to the time spent in the study (e.g. 1 credit for 1 hour, 2 credits for 2 hours).  
 
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw 
your permission at anytime for any reason without penalty or prejudice from the 
investigator.  Please feel free to ask any questions of the investigator before signing this 
form and at any time during the study. 
 
IRB Contact Information 
For one’s rights as a research subject, you may contact the following: For questions about 
your rights as a research subject, please contact the Director, Office of Research Integrity, 
Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306, (765) 285-5070 or at irb@bsu.edu. 
 
 
Study Title   How the Brain Responds to Reasoning Tasks 
 
********** 
 
Consent 
I, ___________________, agree to participate in this research project entitled, “Religious 
Commitment and its Relationship to Reasoning on Moral and Conventional Tasks.” I 
have had the study explained to me and my questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction.  I have read the description of this project and give my consent to participate.  
I understand that I will receive a copy of this informed consent form to keep for future 
reference. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, I meet the inclusion/exclusion criteria for participation 
(described on the previous page) in this study. 
 
 
 
________________________________   _________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Contact Information 
 
Principal Investigator:  
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Aaron Esche, MS 
Doctoral Student 
Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services      
Ball State University 
Muncie, IN  47306 
Telephone:  (765)-285-8040 
Email: amesche@bsu.edu 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
 
Kristin Perrone McGovern, PhD 
Professor 
Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services      
Ball State University 
Muncie, IN  47306 
Telephone:  (765) 285-8040 
Email:  kperrone@bsu.edu 
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Appendix C – Recruitment Email 
Email Subject Line: Participants Needed for Brain Study 
 
Hello, 
 
I am seeking participants for a study on to examine patterns of brain activity during 
reasoning tasks. 
This study will be held in North Quad 069 and will take approximately 1-1/2 to 2 hours 
of your time.  
 
In this study, you will complete a questionnaire and participate in a behavioral reasoning 
task via computer. EEG procedures will be used to examine brain activity.  EEG works 
by recording the electrical activity of a person’s brain. The EEG process involves a 
cap with electrodes being placed on your head after which you will perform the 
computerized task while brain activity is recorded.  Gel will be placed in holes in the cap 
and will get into your hair.  The gel is non-toxic and washes out easily with a shower.  
Participants must be willing to have gel placed in their hair for the EEG section of 
the study.  
 
Qualifications for participation: In order to participate in this study you must be at least 
18 years of age at the time of the study and enrolled as a student at Ball State University.  
If you're interested in participating, please e-mail Aaron at amesche@bsu.edu to set up an 
appointment.   
 
 
Thanks so much! 
 
Aaron Esche, MS 
Doctoral Student 
Kristin Perrone-McGovern, PhD 
Faculty Advisor 
Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services 
Ball State University 
Muncie, IN 47306 
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Appendix D – Response to Scheduled Participants 
Hello,  
You have scheduled an appointment to participate in a research study about brain activity 
and performance on behavioral tasks. Thank you for your interest and willingness to 
participate! 
The study will take place in NQ069 at the following time:  
(Date/Time) 
A few things you need to know before your session: 
 Please come to the session with DRY hair. 
o Wet hair will make you ineligible for participating in the EEG section of 
the experiment and you will be asked kindly to reschedule your 
appointment. 
 Make sure you qualify for the study! 
o You are: 
 18 years or older 
 A student at Ball State University 
 Please arrive on time. If you are unable to make your scheduled appointment, 
please e-mail me ASAP at amesche@bsu.edu to reschedule your appointment for 
a more convenient time.  
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to email me at amesche@bsu.edu.  
 
I greatly appreciate your time and participation! 
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Appendix E – Demographic Questionnaire 
Health and Demographics Questionnaire 
 
 
participant code:_____________ 
 
 
The following set of questions is to screen for factors known to affect sensory 
information processing. Please be as honest as possible.  
 
1. What is your date of birth? ____________ 
 
2. In the blank provided, please indicate your gender ________________ 
 
3. My religious view is: 
a. Atheist 
b. Agnostic 
c. Buddhist 
b. Hindu 
c. Jewish 
d. Muslim 
e. Protestant Christian 
f. Roman Catholic 
g. Other_______________________________________________ 
 
4. What is your ethnicity? 
 a. American Indian or Alaska Native 
 b. Asian 
 c. Black or African American 
 d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 e. White 
 f. Hispanic/Latino/Latina 
 g. Other 
 
5. Have you ever hit your head and experienced a concussion?  
 a. Yes  
 b. No 
 
6. If yes, please explain and include the date and number of concussions 
experienced:____________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Since birth have you ever had any other medical problems 
 a. Yes  
 b. No 
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8. If yes, please explain: _________________________________________ 
 
9. Since birth have you ever been hospitalized? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
10. If yes, please explain:___________________________________________ 
 
11. Do you use tobacco (smoke and/or chew)? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
12. If yes, please explain:___________________________________________ 
 
13. Have you had any hearing problems? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
14. If yes, please explain:_________________________________________________ 
 
15. Are you on any medications? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
16. If yes, please list them all including birth control: 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
17. Do you have now or have you ever had any of the following? Select yes or no.  
 
Diabetes        Yes    No 
Neurological disorder       Yes    No 
Brain disorder       Yes    No 
Vascular disorder      Yes    No 
Stroke        Yes    No 
Learning deficiency or disorder    Yes    No 
Reading deficiency or disorder    Yes    No 
Attention-deficit disorder     Yes    No 
Hyperactivity       Yes    No 
 
18. If you checked yes for any of the items in the previous question, please describe your 
diagnosis briefly: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F – Debriefing for Participants 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this study is took look at 
how people with different levels of religious commitment might process morally laden 
information differently. Now that we have your brain activity recorded, we are going to 
look at how specific brain areas were activated while you were asked to judge whether 
certain scenarios were “Ok” or “Not Ok.”  
 
It is our hope to be able to use this information to better understand how individuals take 
information from the world, reason with it, and ultimately make meaning of it.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and for your participation in this study. It is very 
much appreciated! 
 
Researcher Contact Information 
 
Principal Investigator: 
Aaron Esche, MS 
Doctoral Student 
Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services      
Ball State University 
Muncie, IN  47306 
Telephone:  (765)-285-8040 
Email: amesche@bsu.edu 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
Kristin Perrone McGovern, PhD 
Professor 
Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services      
Ball State University 
Muncie, IN  47306 
Telephone:  (765) 285-8040 
Email:  kperrone@bsu.edu 
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Appendix G – The Religious Commitment Inventory-10 
The Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (RCI-10) 
Instructions: Read each of the following statements. Using the scale to the right, CIRCLE the 
response that best describes how true each statement is for you. 
Not at all 
true of me 
1 
Somewhat 
true of me 
2 
Moderately 
true of me 
3 
Mostly 
true of me 
4 
Totally 
true of me 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. I often read books and magazines about my faith.   
2. I make financial contributions to my religious organization. 
3. I spend time trying to grow in understanding of my faith. 
4. Religion is especially important to me because it answers 
many questions about the meaning of life.  
5. My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life. 
6. I enjoy spending time with others of my religious affiliation.  
7. Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life.  
8. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private 
religious thought and reflection.  
9. I enjoy working in the activities of my religious 
organization. 
10. I keep well informed about my local religious group and 
have some influence in its decisions. 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
1     2     3     4     5 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT  108 
Appendix H – Scenarios and Endings (Lahat, Helwig, & Zelazo; 2013) 
 
Scenario 
Ending 
Moral Conventional Neutral 
Sarah had dinner at a restaurant with her friend, Anna. They ordered spaghetti 
with meatballs, which they wanted to share. The waiter brought them their 
meal and told them that there were no more forks and spoons left. Sarah 
decided to use her hands in order to… 
Ruin It Consume It Return It 
In Sharon’s school students should address their teachers by their title or last 
name, but not by their first name. Sharon saw her teacher, Dr. Jason Smith, 
in the hallway and said: “Hello… 
Butthead Jason Doctor 
Josh played a basketball game in the school playground with some of his 
friends. Suddenly, he started to… 
Insult Undress Dribble 
Jennifer was very bored during class. She wanted to be somewhere else. 
When her teacher asked her a question she decided to… 
Hit Leave Speak 
George was a very short boy. He wanted to be a few inches taller. He found 
his mother’s high heels and decided to… 
Smash them Wear them Shine them 
In Alex’s house, there is a rule that toys and books have to be put back in 
their place after using them. Alex finished reading a book he found on the 
bookcase and placed it on the floor. Instead of returning it to its place he 
decided to… 
Rip it Leave it Read it 
Nathan wanted to contribute to the class discussion. He looked at his friend, 
Dan, who was sitting beside him and suddenly he started… 
Kicking Yelling Smiling 
In Tom’s school students are not allowed to enter or open the door of a class 
that already started. Tom overslept, and when he arrived at the school the 
teacher had already began teaching. He stood in front of the classroom door. 
He looked at the door-knob and decided to… 
Break it Turn it Clean it 
David and Ben were in the library studying for an important test on the next 
day. They realized it was late, and they were running out of time. While 
they were still in the library and had a couple of more hours to study they 
decided to… 
Cheat Shout Try 
Alice woke up and went to her closet to choose what she would wear to 
school that day. She saw the pajamas she borrowed from her sister and 
decided that when she goes to school that day she would… 
Shred them Wear them Fold them 
In Jennifer’s school chewing gum during class is not allowed. Her classmate, 
Ted, offered her a pack of gum. While the teacher was speaking during 
class, Jennifer looked at the gum and decided to… 
Steal it Chew it Save it 
Sara was in the library and she was whispering to her friend, Jessica. When 
she whispered she was… 
Hurtful Noisy Quiet 
Ted sat at the dinner table with his family. Suddenly he started… Fighting Burping Grinning 
Michael woke up and started getting ready for school. He decided to go over 
to his sister’s closet. He saw a dress and he… 
Tore it Wore it Left it 
    
 
